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The study of epistemic reasoning is one of the core areas in Computer Science
and Artificial Intelligence. The traditional systems of formal epistemology
are based on modal logics and have been subjects of intense research activity
during the past decades [Fagin et al., 1995; Meyer and Hoek, 1995]. There are
several computer-aided systems of modal and epistemic reasoning available
(for an incomplete list, see [Schmidt, 2009]).
A recent foundational effort in this area has enriched modal epistemic
logic with the internalized notion of justification, which became part of
the language of epistemic logic [Antonakos, 2007; Artemov, 2001; Arte-
mov and Nogina, 2005; Artemov, 2006; Artemov, 2008; Brezhnev, 2000;
Brezhnev and Kuznets, 2006; Bryukhov, 2005; Fitting, 2005; Krupski, 2006b;
Krupski, 2006a; Kuznets, 2008; Milnikel, 2007; Renne, 2008; Rubtsova, 2006;
Yavorskaya (Sidon), 2006]. This development substantially broadens the
scope of applications of epistemic logic. We now have the capability to not
only reason about epistemic states of knowledge and belief of agents, but also
to track their justifications and to sort those which are pertinent to given
3
facts and sufficient for epistemic conclusions. The very notion of Evidence
became the subject of rigorous studies.
Knowledge, belief, and evidence are fundamental notions which appear
in a wide range of areas. Among already existing and potential applications
of epistemic reasoning with justifications are Artificial Intelligence, Infor-
mation Security, Game Theory and Economics, Philosophy, Mathematics,
Computer-Aided reasoning systems, Law, etc.
This dissertation is the first to build and study computer-aided systems
of epistemic reasoning with justifications. The main focus of this disserta-
tion is Artemov’s Realization Theorem, which is the fundamental result that
reveals the robust evidence system behind traditional epistemic modal logic
reasoning. The Realization Theorem recovers evidence terms for each oc-
currence of epistemic modality in a given theorem. The first version of the
realization theorem was established in [Artemov, 1995; Artemov, 2001] and
produced evidence terms which could be exponential in the length of a given
cut-free proof of the theorem. Further improvements, starting with [Brezh-
nev and Kuznets, 2006], have lowered this bound significantly and offered a
realization algorithm which produces evidence terms quadratic in the size of
a given cut-free proof of an epistemic modal theorem. In this dissertation
work, we improve and implement Brezhnev-Kuznets’ realization algorithm
and test its performance on a number of paradigmatic epistemic problems.
These tests show robust behavior of realization terms in which complexity
stays firmly within theoretically predicted polynomial (quadratic) bounds.
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Our implementation of the Realization Algorithm is performed within the
framework of the MetaPRL computer-aided reasoning system.
The dissertation consists of two Chapters. In the first Chapter, we make
a deep, systematic comparison of the MetaPRL system with the well-known
system Coq, which is also based on the idea of using higher-order type sys-
tems and constructive reasoning. We implement in MetaPRL the Calculus
of Inductive Constructions which is the theoretical base for Coq. This work
has shown that the common points of MetaPRL and Coq revealed their prin-
cipal methodological differences. A projected application of this work is the
possibility of performnig re-validation of the existing library of Coq proofs
which could help to build more trust in Coq.
Chapter Two contains the main contribution of the dissertation: the im-
plementation of the Realization Algorithm and the results of tests runs on a
wide range of well-known epistemic problems.
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Chapter 1
Implementation of Calculus of
Inductive Constructions in
MetaPRL logical framework
MetaPRL is a logical framework that was conceived in an attempt to ad-
dress scalability problems and other limitations of its predecessor, NuPRL.
The most well-developed logic in MetaPRL is a variation of Per Martin-Löf’s
Intuitionistic Type Theory. MetaPRL is positioned as a logical framework,
therefore, it is interesting to see how well it can handle other logics. This
work is an attempt to implement the Calculus of Inductive Constructions
(CIC) in MetaPRL. CIC is the underlying logic of Coq proof assistant, which
has an extensive mathematical library and is actively developed in Europe.
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1.1 Overview of Coq and Calculus of Induc-
tive Constructions
The Coq proof development system allows to build proofs interactively, and
provides various (Coq-)certified decision and semi-decision algorithms [Coq,
a]. It includes extensive libraries, has graphical user interface and documen-
tation tools, and can also be used in Proof General Emacs mode.
This system is the result of more than 25 years of research. In 1984,
Thierry Coquand and Gérard Huet developed and implemented the Calculus
of Constructions. In 1991, Christine Paulin-Mohring extended it to the Cal-
culus of Inductive Constructions [Paulin-Mohring, 1993]. The system further
developed from the efforts of Chet Murthy, Jean-Christophe Filliâtre, Bruno
Barras, and Hugo Herbelin. More than thirty other people contributed to
the development of specific features. (Many more people contributed and
continue to contribute to the system.)
Calculus of Inductive Constructions is based on typed lambda calculus.
Without a notion of inductive definition, it is basically λPw (aka λC) in
Barendregt’s cube of typed lambda calculi [Barendregt, 1992b] or to Girard’s
polymorphic Fw system [Girard, 1986] extended with types dependent on
terms.
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1.2 Overview of MetaPRL logical framework
The MetaPRL [Met, ; Hickey, 2001; Hickey et al., 2003b] project commenced
in 1996 with the intention of addressing the concerns of scalability in formal
systems, as it was realized that its predecessor, NuPRL, does not really scale
to some verification problems.
In MetaPRL, logics are composed from modules, which are constructed
incrementally by adding formal properties, e.g., definitions, rules, and theo-
rems [Hickey, 2003; Hickey et al., 2003c]. The empty module is the root of
each logic. This construction allows re-use: logics can share a common core
with properties that are inherited as they are extended. Relations between
logics are constructed by inheritance or explicitly constructed as functions
between modules. Modularity of MetaPRL provides the flexibility to support
a wide range of applications and restricts the logical search complexity.
Coq also employs modular design to structure its mathematical library;
modules there should be compatible with each other, because they belong
to the same logic. In MetaPRL, many logics can be developed, therefore
modules can be incompatible.
One can interact with MetaPRL either via console or Internet browser.
In the latter instance, the user basically has the same console enhanced by
menu and structural point-and-click access to proofs and terms.
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1.3 Translation
MetaPRL logical framework allows definition of Gentzen-style rule schemas.
Coq does not have an explicit formal description of rules; they are implicitly
manifested by Coq implementation.
We are aware of only one formalization of Coq rules, which was imple-
mented in Coq itself, [Barras, 1999]. It is not an exact implementation; its
treatment of inductive types is a bit different. As you will see later, we also
had to deviate because the original rules from the [Coq, b] manual are very
complex in some places. Moreover, Coq authors admit that those areas are
the primary source of problems, and required tweaking more than once.
We will go over the rules from the Coq manual and present our reimple-
mentation in MetaPRL notation.
First, however, let us briefly discuss MetaPRL rule syntax and semantics.
One can find more information on MetaPRL web-site http://metaprl.org.
1.3.1 MetaPRL Rule Syntax and Semantics
A rule has roughly the following form:
rule Name Arguments :
Sequent1 --> ... SequentN --> Sequent,
where Sequent1, . . . , SequentN are assumptions and Sequent is a conclusion.
Each sequent has the form
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sequent { Hyp1; ...; HypN >- Conclusion }.
Each hypothesis is either a variable declaration ‘v : Term’ or a context
‘<H>.’ The first-order variable v is bound for the rest of the sequent. The vari-
able declaration can actually omit the variable’s name if it is irrelevant and
not used elsewhere. Contexts are placeholders for arbitrarily many variable
declarations.
The ‘Term’ in a variable declaration ‘v : Term’ is a term with probably
some occurrences of second- and first-order variables.
First-order variables are introduced by variable declarations and terms
(lambda abstraction, quantifiers introducing new bound first-order variables).
Names of bound first-order variables are prefixed by single quotes to distin-
guish them from constants and simplify parsing.
Second-order variables are also prefixed with single quotes and can be
used in place of a (sub)term. They function as placeholders and, together
with contexts, provide a mechanism for defining rule schemas rather than
rule instances. Unlike first-order variables, second-order variables’ binding
scope is the entire rule.
Example:
rule A ’a :
sequent{ <H>; x:’T; <J[’x]>; <K<|H|> > >- ’a in S<|J|>[’x] } -->
sequent{ <H>; x:’T; <J[’x]>; <K<|H|> > >- ’S<|J|>[’x] in Set },
10
here x is a first-order variable and a, T , and S are second-order variables.
Second-order variables are placeholders for arbitrary terms. H, J , and K
are contexts, i.e., placeholders for an arbitrary number of first-order variable
declarations.
Square bracket notation here means that free occurrences of x are allowed
in J, S. No free occurrences of x are allowed in K.
The reverse is true of dependencies on contexts: when no explicit depen-
dency is listed, dependency on all preceding contexts is assumed. J has no
explicit context dependency here and so depends on H, not on K, because
K is declared after J . K explicitly depends only on H and is not allowed to
depend on J . S depends on J only and is not allowed to depend on H and
K.
When we say that a context J depends on a variable x, we mean that
hypotheses, which are matched with J in a particular instance of the rule at
hand, can have free occurrences of x.
When we say that a second-order variable A depends on a context, we
mean that in a particular instance of the rule at hand, i.e., where that context
is instantiated as v1 : T1, . . . , vn : Tn, A can depend on v1, . . . , vn.
When we say that a context ∆ depends on a context Γ, we mean that in
a particular instance of the rule at hand, in which context Γ is instantiated
as v1 : T1, . . . , vn : Tn and context ∆ is instantiated as w1 : S1, . . . , wm : Sm,
each of Si can depend on v1, . . . , vn.
11
In MetaPRL, rules are usually applied backwards, meaning that for rule
A from above to be applicable to a given goal, its conclusion sequent has
to match the goal. In this case, the goal is replaced with several goals,
one for each assumption sequent with all second-order variables replaced by
matching terms from the original goal.
If some second-order variables do not occur in the conclusion sequent of
the rule, substituting terms have to be provided by the time of rule appli-
cation. In the case of rule A, a is such a variable and is listed in the rule
header to let MetaPRL know which term has to be used for a when the rule
is applied.
Also, in situations such as this:
rule B ’H ’A :
sequent { <H>; ’A; <J> >- ’C } -->
sequent { <H>; <J> >- ’C },
MetaPRL has no idea where to split the list of hypotheses in order to insert
A, so it has to again be provided by a parameter to the rule (note ’H in the
rule header); this parameter is not really a context but a natural number
designating how many hypotheses have to be allocated to H. The rest will
go to J .
In the following text, we will gradually change from an explicit Meta-
PRL syntax to a more standard mathematical notation. This is done to give
readers a taste of the syntactic capabilities and limitations of MetaPRL, and
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to simultaneously conceal trivial details in complex rules that will follow at
the end of this chapter. In particular, to indicate a dependency on context,
we will write ΓI,〈∆〉 to indicate that ΓI depends on ∆.
1.3.2 Non-inductive component of Calculus of Induc-
tive Constructions
From this point, we follow closely the structure of the Coq 7.3 manual [Coq,
b], and implement almost every rule in MetaPRL. Whenever we refer to a
rule by name, we mean a rule from the manual. Later in the text, we switch
to a couple of related papers because the manual starts skipping details.
The terms
CIC is a typed lambda calculus, therefore, all well-formed terms have types.
We therefore have to declare a term
declare member{’t;’T},
displayed as t ∈ T , which states that t has type T . One has to distinguish
variable declarations t : T in hypotheses from judgments t ∈ T . The former
is a fixed syntactic construct, the latter a user-defined term. Traditional CIC




Types are terms themselves. Every type belongs to either Set, Prop, or




double quotes are used because MetaPRL is an OCaml extension and ‘type’ is
an OCaml keyword. [i:l] means that the term has a non-term parameter i
– a level expression, i.e., a composition of successor and maximum operations
and natural numbers.
Terms
CIC terms are built from the following rules:
(A) the sorts Set, Prop, and Typei are terms;
(B) global names (constants) from the environment are terms;
(C) variables are terms;
(D) (x : T )U is a term if x is a variable, and T and U are terms. This is
a dependent product, defined in MetaPRL as fun{’T; x.’U[’x]} with
shorter notation x:’T -> ’U[x];
(E) [x : T ]U is a term if x is a variable, T and U are terms. This is a
λ-abstraction, MetaPRL syntax is lambda{’T; x.’U[’x]};
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(F) (T U) is a term if T and U are terms. It is an application term, defined
in MetaPRL as apply{’T; ’U} and short syntax ’T ’U;
(G) [x := t]T is a term if t and T are terms and x is a variable. This is a
let-in construct, MetaPRL syntax is let in{’t; x.’T[’x]}.
Typed terms
Coq local context is a list of typed variable declarations. Coq has two types of
declarations: assumptions x : T and definitions x := t : T . The latter is not
directly supported by MetaPRL; it also does not appear essential to CIC so
we decided not to reproduce it for the present. Note that CIC context is not
a fully functional standalone notion because it introduces binding of some
variables and needs some destination where this binding will work. Meta-
PRL’s analog of CIC context is called sequent, mainly for historical reasons.
Sequent is a special kind of term with three components: a label, a binding
(list of typed variable declarations), and a term where those declared vari-
ables are bound. Since sequent is a term, it can be used anywhere a regular
term can be used, in particular it means that sequents can be nested.
CIC rules also make use of environment, which is a list of global declaration
of constants. ’Global’ means that constants added to the environment in one
statement (theorem or declaration) survive to the following statements.
While MetaPRL supports some internal analog of Coq environment, it
does not allow rules to operate on it explicitly.
The difference between the MetaPRL and Coq notions of environment is
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the fact that MetaPRL allows the addition of constants that are not neces-
sarily well-defined from a CIC point of view. On the other hand, CIC ensures
that all added terms are well-typed.
Whenever we encounter an assumption of a rule of the form that some-
thing is in the environment, we can replace it with the assumption that it is
well-typed.
We could, of course, emulate environment as an outer sequent (context)
to every judgment, but our goal is to implement CIC in as native a manner
as possible without extra layers of abstraction.
This means that some CIC rules cannot be expressed in MetaPRL explicitly
and some have to be adjusted.
Typing rules
Coq rules have two types of judgments: E[Γ] ` t : T and WF(E)[Γ]. For
the moment, we do not implement the latter. The well-formedness judgment
is used in rules of the form:
WF(E)[Γ] other assumptions
E[Γ] ` some conclusion
.
If we omit the well-formedness assumption, we will allow non-well-formed Γ
in the rule’s conclusion but we can interpret such sequents as vacuously true,
thus not increasing the power of the rule.
It turns out that these two types of judgments are not sufficient, at least
on a user level. We certainly want to make claims such as Γ ` (A ∧ B) →
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(B ∧A) but it is neither a typing nor well-formedness judgment. CIC follows
a propositions-as-types paradigm, so the claim can be reduced to a typing
judgment, but at the moment we formulate it, we do not yet have a witness
term; we will obtain it only when we prove the claim.
Hence it is more straightforward to introduce another judgment of the
form ‘Γ ` T true.’ We can actually omit the ‘true’ part, after which the
typing judgment will be a special case of Γ ` T with t : T being a term.
MetaPRL can be made to track witnesses (extracts in MetaPRL termi-
nology) to every judgment and, returning to our example of conjunction
commutativity, after we prove it we can ask MetaPRL to give us the witness
term, i.e., a member of type (A ∧B)→ (B ∧ A) (in context Γ).
We omit (W-E), (W-S), and (Def ) rules because their conclusions are
well-formedness judgments.
(Ax) group of rules controls the sorts:
rule ax_prop :
sequent { <H> >- member{Prop;"type"[i:l]} }
rule ax_set :
sequent { <H> >- member{Set;"type"[i:l]} }
rule ax_type :
sequent { <H> >- member{"type"[i:l];"type"[i’:l]} } .
We also declare three auxiliary predicates
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declare of_some_sort{’P} // ’P has some sort
declare is_sort{’s} // ’s is a sort
declare prop_set{’s} // ’s is Prop or Set
used in later formalizations, with rules
rule prop_a_sort :
sequent { <H> >- member{’P;Prop} } -->
sequent { <H> >- of_some_sort{’P} }
rule set_a_sort :
sequent { <H> >- member{’P;Set} } -->
sequent { <H> >- of_some_sort{’P} }
rule type_a_sort :
sequent { <H> >- member{’P;"type"[i:l]} } -->
sequent { <H> >- of_some_sort{’P} }
rule set_is_sort :
sequent { <H> >- is_sort{Set} }
rule prop_is_sort :
sequent { <H> >- is_sort{Prop} }
rule type_is_sort :
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sequent { <H> >- is_sort{"type"[i:l]} }
rule prop_a_prop_set :
sequent { <H> >- prop_set{Prop} }
rule set_a_prop_set :
sequent { <H> >- prop_set{Set} } .
We introduce a rule that states how to switch from our ‘T true’ judgment
to a typing judgment:
rule introduction ’t :
sequent { <H> >- ’t in ’T } -->
sequent { <H> >- ’T } = ’t
and how to switch back:
rule proposition :
(’t: sequent { <H> >- ’T }) -->
sequent { <H> >- ’t in ’T } .
The first rule states that in order to prove that T is true, it is sufficient
to prove that t ∈ T for some t. So we have to provide t as a parameter to the
rule, which is why we have t following after the rule name. The ‘= t’ part
in the conclusion part of the rule says that t is a witness to T . In the case
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of this rule, we need to know the witness upfront, but in more complicated
cases it can depend on witnesses to assumption sequents, hence MetaPRL
will have to track it over the course of the proof.
(Var) rule becomes:
rule var ’H :
sequent { <H> >- of_some_sort{’T} } -->
sequent { <H>; x: ’T; <J[’x]> >- ’x in ’T }
and as previously stated, we do not support let expressions yet and instead
of the well-formedness requirement for the entire context and environment,
we only impose a check on T .
(Const) rule basically states that if we proved earlier that some constant
is of certain type, we can use it in our proof; however, this is a standard
MetaPRL feature that does not require a separate rule.





displayed as x : T → U [x], λx : T.t[x] and, t u respectively.
Rules (Prod) for dependent product become:
rule prod_1 ’s1 :
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sequent { <H> >- prop_set{’s1} } -->
sequent { <H> >- member{ ’T; ’s1 } } -->
sequent { <H>; x:’T >- member{ ’U[’x]; ’s2 } } -->
sequent { <H> >- (x:’T -> ’U[’x]) in ’s2 }
rule prod_2 ’s1 :
sequent { <H>; x:’T >- prop_set{’s2} } -->
sequent { <H>; x:’T >- ’U[’x] in ’s2 } -->
sequent { <H> >- ’T in ’s1 } -->
sequent { <H> >- (x:’T -> ’U[’x]) in ’s2 }
rule prod_types "type"[i:l] "type"[j:l] :
sequent { <H> >- ’T in "type"[i:l] } -->
sequent { <H>; x:’T >- ’U[’x] in "type"[j:l] } -->
sequent { >- level_le[i:l,k:l] } -->
sequent { >- level_le[j:l,k:l] } -->
sequent { <H> >- (x:’T -> ’U[’x]) in "type"[k:l] } .
Traditionally, when U does not depend on an element of T , it is rendered
as T → U . Unfortunately, to make this format acceptable by the MetaPRL
parser, one has to define a separate term and axiomatize its equivalence. It
is somewhat difficult to support this equivalent form uniformly and automat-
ically because at the time of this writing, MetaPRL does not provide such
capability out of the box.
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(Lam) rule becomes:
rule lam ’s :
sequent { <H> >- (x:’T -> ’U[’x]) in ’s } -->
sequent { <H> >- is_sort{’s } } -->
sequent { <H>; x:’T >- ’t[’x] in ’U[’x] } -->
sequent { <H> >- lambda{’T;x.’t[’x]} in (x:’T -> ’U[’x]) } .
(App) becomes:
rule app (x:’T -> ’U[’x]) :
sequent { <H> >- ’u in (x:’T -> ’U[’x]) } -->
sequent { <H> >- ’t in ’T } -->
sequent { <H> >- apply{’u;’t} in ’U[’t] }
rule appFormation (x:’T -> ’U[’x]) :
(’u : sequent { <H> >- x:’T -> ’U[’x] }) -->
(’t : sequent { <H> >- ’T })-->
sequent { <H> >- ’U[’t] } = apply{’u;’t} .
The second rule is a derivative of the first, and is a form of the cut rule.
For now, we do not implement let in-related rules.
Also note that despite Gentzen-style formulation here of all rules, Coq’s
interface utilizes natural deduction style, so CIC rules do not possess the
usual complementarity of Gentzen style systems, i.e., introduction rules are
present but elimination rules are usually not.
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1.3.3 Conversion rules
beta-conversion is defined as follows:
rewrite beta :
( apply{ lambda{’T; x.’t[’x]}; ’u } ) <--> ( ’t[’u] )
ι-reduction will be discussed after introduction of induction definitions.
δ-conversion and ζ-conversion are about let construct in contexts and
let in term, both of which we currently do not support.
Convertibility rule goes into MetaPRL without change; it basically states
that if type A is ‘less’ then type B, all members of A are also members of B:
declare conv_le{’t; ’s}
rule conv_le_1 :
sequent { <H> >- conv_le{ ’t; ’t } }
rule conv_le_2 :
sequent { >- level_le[i:l,j:l] } -->
sequent { <H> >- conv_le{ "type"[i:l]; "type"[j:l] } }
rule conv_le_3 :
sequent { <H> >- conv_le{ Prop; "type"[i:l] } }
rule conv_le_4 :
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sequent { <H> >- conv_le{ Set; "type"[i:l] } }
rule conv_le_5 :
sequent { <H>; x:’T >- conv_le{ ’T1[’x]; ’U1[’x] } } -->
sequent { <H> >- conv_le{ (x:’T -> ’T1[’x]); (x:’T -> ’U1[’x]) }}
rule conv_rule ’s ’T:
sequent { <H> >- ’U in ’s } -->
sequent { <H> >- ’t in ’T } -->
sequent { <H> >- conv_le{ ’T; ’U } } -->
sequent { <H> >- ’t in ’U } .
1.3.4 Inductive definitions
The most general form of inductive definition in CIC has the form:
Ind(Γ)[ΓP ](ΓI := ΓC)
where
Γ is the context in which this definition is well-formed,
ΓP is a list of typed parameters,
ΓI is a list of hereby inductively defined types,
ΓC is a list of constructors for those types.
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Example 1
Ind()[A : Set](List : Set := nil : List, cons : A→ List→ List)
defines an inductive type of list, List T then is a list of elements of type T
(where T : Set), nil T is an empty list of type List T , cons T h t is a list
of type List T with head h (of type T ) and tail t (of type List T ).
Note that this definition cannot be used to refer to a list of propositions
because propositions do not belong to sort Set.
Because inductive definitions have variable arity, we have to use sequents.
Also, both ΓI and ΓC can refer to ΓP and for that matter, ΓC can refer to
ΓI ; we had to make these sequents nested. Γ is a regular hypothesis list, so
we do not really have to include it into the definition.
declare sequent [IndParams] { Term : Term >- Term } : Term
declare sequent [IndTypes] { Term : Term >- Term } : Term
declare sequent [IndConstrs] { Term : Term >- Term } : Term
and list definition becomes
IndParams{| A: Set >-
IndTypes{| List: Set >-





where it is a ‘unit’ term which just fills sequent’s succedent placeholder.
Types of inductive objects
Every inductive type and constructor from a well-formed inductive definition
(the rule will follow) has a certain type and is automatically added to the
environment.
Assuming ΓP is [p1 : P1; . . . ; pr : Pr], ΓI is [I1 : A1; . . . ; Ik : Ak], and ΓC is
[c1 : C1; . . . ; cn : Cn],
Ind(Γ)[ΓP ](ΓI := ΓC) ∈ E
(Ij : (p1 : P1) . . . (pr : Pr)Aj) ∈ E
for all j and
Ind(Γ)[ΓP ](ΓI := ΓC) ∈ E
(ci : (p1 : P1) . . . (pr : Pr)Ci{Ij/(Ijp1 . . . pr)}j=1...k) ∈ E
for all i.
As previously mentioned, MetaPRL does not allow rules to add new con-
stants to the environment, so our rules only assert types, and declaring new
constants in a global context can be done separately using declare instruc-
tion.
As was probably observed, CIC uses ‘massive’ notation extensively, i.e.,
we can find this syntax in the rule definitions:
• (t t1 . . . tn) which stands for (. . . (t t1) . . . tn),
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• (p1 : P1) . . . (pn : Pn)A is a multiple dependent product,
• [p1 : P1; . . . ; pn : Pn]A is a multiple λ-abstraction.
Consequently, we had to formalize such notations.
declare sequent [prodH] { Term : Term >- Term } : Term
prim_rw prodH_base {| reduce |} :
prodH{| >- ’S |} <--> ’S
prim_rw prodH_step {| reduce |} :
prodH{| <H>; x:’T >- ’S[’x] |} <-->
prodH{| <H> >- x:’T -> ’S[’x] |}
basically states that prodH with empty antecedent is equivalent to its succe-
dent. If the antecedent is not empty, we can move the last type to succedent
and use it as a domain to form a dependent product with old succedent.
Therefore, we have a recursive definition which states that prodH{| x1:
T1; ...; xn: Tn >- S[’x1,...,’xn] |} is equivalent to (x1 : T1) . . . (xn :
Tn)S. Later in the text we will write (Γ)S for (x1 : T1) . . . (xn : Tn)S if
Γ = x1 : T1, . . . , xn : Tn.
We also define helper functions that can perform full transformation be-
tween prodH and a series of fun in one (composite) step.
Remember, that MetaPRL does not allow rules to add new constants
to the environment, hence we need some means of referring to types and
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constructors defined inductively. We do so by placing a variable representing
the required type or constructor into the succedent of the innermost sequent
of the inductive definition.
Example 2 define unfold_List : List <-->
IndParams{| A: Set >-
IndTypes{| List: Set >-




Here, the last occurrence of the List variable is where the meaning of the
entire expression is defined. As a matter of fact, one can use not only List,
nil, and cons here, but any expression.
This is controlled by the following rewrites:
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Ind[ΓP ](ΓI ; I : T〈ΓP 〉; ∆I,〈ΓP 〉 := ΓC [I])t[I]↔
Ind[ΓP ](ΓI ; I : T〈ΓP 〉; ∆I,〈ΓP 〉 := ΓC [I])t[
Ind[ΓP ](ΓI ; I : T〈ΓP 〉; ∆I,〈ΓP 〉 := ΓC [I])I]
(indSubstDef)
Ind[ΓP ](ΓI := ΓC ; c : C〈ΓP ,ΓI〉; ∆C,〈ΓP ,ΓI〉)t[c]↔
Ind[ΓP ](ΓI := ΓC ; c : C〈ΓP ,ΓI〉; ∆C,〈ΓP ,ΓI〉)t[
Ind[ΓP ](ΓI := ΓC ; c : C〈ΓP ,ΓI〉; ∆C,〈ΓP ,ΓI〉)c]
(indSubstConstr)
Ind[ΓP ](ΓI := ΓC)t〈〉 ↔ t
(indCarryOut).
We also need to define the massive application:
declare sequent [applH] { Term : Term >- Term } : Term
rewrite applHBase :




applH{| x:’T; <H> >- ’S |} <-->
applH{| <H> >- apply{’S;’T}|} .
It might appear to reverse the order, but we want applH{| H >- S |} to
mean S H with arguments for S listed in usual order, hence the definition.
Later, we will write it as S Γ for S t1 . . . tn if Γ = x1 : t1, . . . , xn : tn. Note
that variables’ declarations in Γ do not matter – only the types (terms).
Massive lambda abstraction:
declare sequent [lambdaH] { Term : Term >- Term } : Term
rewrite lambdaHBase :
lambdaH{| >-’t|} <--> ’t
rewrite lambdaHStep :
lambdaH{|<H>; x:’s >-’t[’x]|} <-->
lambdaH{|<H> >-lambda{’s; x.’t[’x]}|},
a shorter notation is λΓ.t (traditional) or [Γ]t (Coq style).
Finally, we are ‘almost’ ready to define MetaPRL versions of typing rules
for inductive types and constructors. Assuming ΓP is [p1 : P1; . . . ; pr : Pr],
ΓI is [I1 : A1; . . . ; Ik : Ak], and ΓC is [c1 : C1; . . . ; cn : Cn],
Γ ` IndWF[ΓP ](ΓI := ΓC)
Γ ` (Ind[ΓP ](ΓI := ΓC)Ij) : (ΓP ).Aj
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for all j and
Γ ` IndWF[ΓP ](ΓI := ΓC)
Γ ` ((Ind[ΓP ](ΓI := ΓC)ci) : (ΓP )Ci{Ij/(Ij ΓP )}j=1...k)
for all i. We have put ‘almost’ in quotes because the definition of massive sub-
stitution used in the last rule required 16 new types of sequents, 7 primitive
rewrites, and several times more consequence-rewrites and helper functions
that allow it to perform the substitution by applying those rewrites in the
correct order. Its complexity is due to the fact that it had to be performed
simultaneously with wrapping into a massive dependent product in order
to handle variable binding correctly. Basically, it is a recursive algorithm
that goes over every inductive type and parameter and adds parameters to
inductive type arguments and wraps everything into a product.
Well-formed inductive definitions
The semi-formal rule from the Coq manual looks like this:
(E[Γ; ΓP ] ` Aj : s′j)j=1...k (E[Γ; ΓP ; ΓI ] ` Ci : spi)i=1...n
WF(E; Ind(Γ)[ΓP ](ΓI := ΓC))[Γ]
with the extra conditions:
(A) k > 0, Ij, ci are different names for j = 1 . . . k and i = 1 . . . n,
(B) for j = 1 . . . k we have Aj is an arity of sort sj and Ij /∈ Γ ∪ E,
(C) for i = 1 . . . n we have Ci is a type of constructor of Ipi which satisfies
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the positivity condition for I1 . . . Ik and ci /∈ Γ ∪ E.
These conditions are certainly the most important part of the rule and we
had to formalize them.
Our version of the rule itself looks like this:
Γ; ΓP ` of some sort m(ΓI)
Γ; ΓP ` arity of some sort m(ΓI)
Γ; ΓP ` req3 m(ΓI := ΓC)
Γ ` IndWF[ΓP ](ΓI := ΓC)
where of some sort m(ΓI) checks that for every I : A in ΓI Γ,ΓP `
of some sort(A) holds.
Similarly, arity of some sort m(ΓI) checks that for every I : A in ΓI
Γ,ΓP ` arity of some sort(A) holds. arity of some sort(A) is defined by
the following rules:
Γ ` arity of some sort(Set) Γ ` arity of some sort(Prop)
Γ ` arity of some sort( Typei)
Γ;x : T ` arity of some sort(U [x])
Γ ` arity of some sort((x : T )U)
req3 m(ΓI := ΓC) checks that for every c : C from ΓC
Γ,ΓP ` req3(ΓI ;C〈Γ,ΓP ,ΓI〉) holds.
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Where req3 is controlled by this rule:
Γ,ΓI , I : A〈Γ〉,∆I,〈Γ〉 ` type of constructor(C[I]; I)
Γ ` positivity cond m(ΓI , I : A〈Γ〉,∆I,〈Γ〉`I)
Γ ` arity of sort(A, s)
Γ,ΓI , I : A〈Γ〉,∆I,〈Γ〉 ` C[I] : s
Γ ` req3(ΓI , I : A〈Γ〉,∆I,〈Γ〉;C[I])
.
type of constructor(C; I) means that C is in a form acceptable for a type
of constructor for an inductive type I:
Γ ` type of constructor((I Γargs); I)
Γ, x : T ` type of constructor(C[x]; I)
Γ ` type of constructor((x : T )C[x]; I) .
Γ ` positivity cond m(ΓI , I : A〈Γ〉,∆I,〈Γ〉 ` C[I]) checks that Γ,ΓI , I :
A〈Γ〉 ` positivity cond(C[I]; I) holds for every I : A from positivity cond m’s
context argument. Singular positivity cond is defined as follows:
Γ, x : T,∆[x] ` positivity cond(x Γargs;x)
Γ, x : S,∆[x] ` strictly pos(x;T [x])
Γ, x : S,∆[x], y : T [x] ` positivity cond(U [y, x];x)
Γ, x : S,∆[x] ` positivity cond((y : T [x])U [y, x];x)
,
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with strictly pos defined as:
Γ, x : S,∆[x] ` strictly pos(x;T )
Γ, x : S,∆[x] ` strictly pos(x;x Γargs)
Γ, x : S,∆[x], y : U ` strictly pos(x;V [y, x])
Γ, x : S,∆[x] ` strictly pos(x; (y : U)V [y, x])
.
One more condition controls the use of inductive definitions in the second
argument of strictly pos but it would require introduction of the notion of
imbricated positivity condition which requires another half-dozen rules, so we
decided not to implement it for the time being.
The last undefined notion is arity of sort(A, s):
Γ ` arity of sort(Set; Set) Γ ` arity of sort(Prop; Prop)
Γ ` arity of sort( Typei; Typei)
Γ, x : T ` arity of sort(U [x]; s)
Γ ` arity of sort((x : T )U [x]; s) .
Destructors
Providing an inductive definition is not enough: one also has to have a means
of using it. For inductive types, we need a way to perform case analysis, i.e.,
which constructor was used to build a given term, as well as a way to define
functions on inductive types recursively. CIC uses two separate operations for
this. For the purposes of consistency and strong normalizability, CIC allows
34
primitive recursion only.
Unfortunately, the Coq manual provides only a simplified version of the
rules with only one inductive type per definition. So we had to look into
[Paulin-Mohring, 1993] for a more general case, which does not, however, use
a parameters context in inductive definitions. Therefore we had to adapt it
to the modern Coq style.
Our version of the non-dependent case analysis rule:
Γ; ΓP,〈〉 ` good nodep(A〈ΓP 〉; s2,〈〉)
Γ; ΓP,〈〉 ` equal length(Γpred,〈Γ〉; ΓI)
Γ ` c : (Ind[ΓP ](ΓI,〈ΓP 〉, I : A〈ΓP 〉,∆I,〈ΓP 〉 := ΓC,〈ΓP ,ΓI ,I,∆I〉)I Γargs)
Γ ` ForAll1T (Γpred,〈Γ〉, P〈Γ〉,∆〈Γ〉; p.(p : (ΓP → s2,〈〉)))
Γ; ΓP,〈〉 ` ForAll1T1DT (ΓF,〈Γ〉;
(ΓI,〈ΓP 〉, I : A〈ΓP 〉,∆I,〈ΓP 〉)ΓC,〈ΓP ,ΓI ,I,∆I〉;
f, v, C.(f : ElimCaseType(C; Γpred,〈Γ〉, P〈Γ〉,∆pred,〈Γ〉))
Γ ` Elim(c; Γpred,〈Γ〉, P〈Γ〉,∆pred,〈Γ〉;ElimCases(ΓF,〈Γ〉)) : (P〈Γ〉 Γargs,〈Γ〉)
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and the dependent case analysis rule:
Γ; ΓP,〈〉 ` good dep(A〈ΓP 〉; s2,〈〉)
Γ; ΓP,〈〉 ` equal length(Γpred,〈Γ〉; ΓI)
Γ ` c : (Ind[ΓP ](ΓI,〈ΓP 〉, I : A〈ΓP 〉,∆I,〈ΓP 〉 := ΓC,〈ΓP ,ΓI ,I,∆I〉)I Γargs)
Γ ` ForAll1T (Γpred,〈Γ〉, P〈Γ〉,∆pred,〈Γ〉;
p.(p : prodApp(ΓP ;
x.(x→ s2,〈〉);
Ind[ΓP ](ΓI,〈ΓP 〉, I : A〈ΓP 〉,∆I,〈ΓP 〉 := ΓC,〈ΓP ,ΓI ,I,∆I〉)I
))
)
Γ ` ForAll1TConstr(ΓF ;
Ind[ΓP ](ΓI,〈ΓP 〉, I : A〈ΓP 〉,∆I,〈ΓP 〉 := ΓC,〈ΓP ,ΓI ,I,∆I〉);
f, v, C.(f : ElimCaseTypeDep(C; Γpred,〈Γ〉, P〈Γ〉,∆pred,〈Γ〉; c)
)
Γ ` Elim(c; Γpred,〈Γ〉, P〈Γ〉,∆pred,〈Γ〉;ElimCases(ΓF,〈Γ〉)) : (P〈Γ〉 Γargs,〈Γ〉 c)
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with the following reductions:
Elim(Ind[ΓP ](ΓI , := ΓC , c : C〈ΓP ,ΓI〉,∆C)c Γargs; Γpred;ElimCases(ΓF )) ↔
ElimBracket(
Ind[ΓP ](ΓI , := ΓC , c : C〈ΓP ,ΓI〉,∆)C;
FunElim(




BackHyp(ΓP ,ΓI ,ΓC ` Back(∆C ` BackIn(ΓF )))
)Γargs
where the purpose of BackHyp, Back and BackIn is to pick the element of F
relevant to c : C. F has one element per each constructor, so this construct
peels as many elements from F tail as ∆C has, and then the last element of
the rest of F is the term relevant to c : C. We had to incorporate ΓP ,ΓI , and
ΓC into the definition because ∆C is not closed relative to them and cannot
be used independently.
mainType picks out an inductive type from the “main” positive position
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of its argument:
mainType(Ind[ΓP ](ΓI := ΓC)((Γ)(x : A)B[x]))↔
mainType(Ind[ΓP ](ΓI := ΓC)((Γ, x : A)B[x]))
mainType(Ind[ΓP ](ΓI := ΓC)((Γ)(A→ B)))↔
mainType(Ind[ΓP ](ΓI := ΓC)((Γ)B))
mainType(Ind[ΓP ](ΓI := ΓC)((Γ)(∆)B[x]))↔
mainType(Ind[ΓP ](ΓI := ΓC)((Γ,∆)B[x]))
mainType(Ind[ΓP ](ΓI := ΓC)((Γ)(Aa)))↔
mainType(Ind[ΓP ](ΓI := ΓC)((Γ)(A)))
mainType(Ind[ΓP ](ΓI := ΓC)((Γ)(A∆)))↔
mainType(Ind[ΓP ](ΓI := ΓC)((Γ)(A)))
mainType(Ind[ΓP ](ΓI , I : A,∆I := ΓC,〈I〉)((Γ〈I〉)I))↔
Ind[ΓP ](ΓI , I : A,∆I := ΓC,〈I〉)I
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After mainType, FunElim does its job:
FunElim(Ind[ΓP ](ΓI , I : A,∆I := ΓC,〈I〉)I)↔
λΓP , c : (Ind[ΓP ](ΓI , I : A,∆I := ΓC,〈I〉)I ΓP ).Elim(c; Γpred;ElimCases(ΓF ))
and for ElimBracket we need the following reductions:
ElimBracket(Ind[ΓP ](ΓI , I : A,∆I := ΓC,〈I〉)(((Γ)(IΓargs,〈Γ〉))→ C[I]);F ; f) ↔
(p : (Γ)(Ind[ΓP ](ΓI , I : A,∆I := ΓC,〈I〉)I Γargs,〈Γ〉))
) ElimBracket(Ind[ΓP ](ΓI , I : A,∆I := ΓC,〈I〉)C[I];
F ;
f p (λΓ.(F Γargs,〈Γ〉 (p Γ)))
)
ElimBracket(Ind[ΓP ](ΓI := ΓC)((x : M〈〉)C[x]);F ; f) ↔
(x : M〈〉)ElimBracket(Ind[ΓP ](ΓI := ΓC)C[x];F ; f x)
ElimBracket(Ind[ΓP ](ΓI := ΓC)(M〈〉)C);F ; f) ↔
(x : M〈〉)ElimBracket(Ind[ΓP ](ΓI := ΓC)C;F ; f x)
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ElimBracket(Ind[ΓP ](ΓI := ΓC)(I Γargs,〈〉);F ; f) ↔
f.
The rules governing fixpoint turned out to be even more complex, see
[Giménez, 1995]. On the other hand, for any reasonable inductive type, one
can come up with a reasonable fixpoint definition relatively easily, which is
the direction Martin-Löf’s ITT [Martin-Löf, 1984] took — he defines a new
type and defines a fixpoint operation for it (if any). The same approach
was used by LEGO [Luo, 1990], which is based on Calculus of Constructions
as Coq. Even Coq lacks a general form of fixpoint well-formedness rule for
mutually inductive types; instead, it offers a tool to generate rule schemas
for particular inductive definitions. We suggest the same approach for our
implementation of CIC in MetaPRL— let users define the fixpoint operations
for their types.
1.4 Summary
We implemented most of the rules of CIC except for the fixpoint rules. The
complexity of these rules was increasingly high and we were overwhelmed
with the complexity of the fixpoint part.
Nevertheless, a MetaPRL approach allows us to add new rules on the spot,
so potential users can add specific instances of these rules as they see fit.
One possible application of this work is to perform re-validation of the
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existing library of Coq proofs. The more recent versions of Coq have a tool
for generating XML representations of proofs but those proofs lack typing
information, therefore, in order to run them against our implementation, we
need to implement automatic type deduction for CIC terms. This, of course,
is a standard feature of Coq, and a topic for future work. Another option is
to make Coq able to export proofs with full typing information.
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Chapter 2
Translation of S4Jn cut-free
proofs into S4nLP proof
2.1 Introduction
S4Jn [Artemov and Nogina, 2005; Artemov, 2006; Artemov, 2007; Fitting,
2007c; Fitting, 2007d] is an epistemic logic of justified knowledge with n
agents. The general study of knowledge and belief is called epistemology,
and the subfield of modal logic that studies knowledge and beliefs is called
epistemic logic. We know that the philosophers of ancient Greece already
pondered such questions as: ‘What do people know?,’ ‘What is knowledge?,’
and ‘What does it mean to say that someone knows something?’ One of the
earliest works on epistemic logic dates back to [von Wright, 1951].
One interesting aspect of epistemology is the study of knowledge in a
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group setting. People (or agents) in a group interact with each other and it
is interesting to observe the knowledge aspects of this interaction. Different
people in a group can know different things so we can try to model certain
aspects of this situation, e.g.
• How can one person’s knowledge affect the knowledge of others?
• Can some knowledge be shared?
One of the basic attempts to formalize shared knowledge is the notion of
common knowledge.
The basic modal operator of epistemic logic is usually written as K, and
read as ‘it is known that.’ If we have a group of n people (agents), then n
modal operators can be used: K1, K2, . . . , Kn and Kiφ stands for ‘agent i
knows φ.’ Two different agents can have different knowledge, i.e., if one of
them knows something, it does not necessary follow that other agents know
it, too. The common knowledge modality C can be defined informally as
Eφ = K1φ ∧K2φ ∧ . . . ∧Knφ
Cφ⇔ φ ∧ Eφ ∧ E2φ ∧ . . . ∧ Enφ ∧ . . ..
n-agent epistemic logic with common knowledge is instrumental for rea-
soning about puzzles such as Muddy Children, Wise Men, etc. [Fagin et al.,
1995].
The traditional approach to formalize common knowledge is to use a
Fixed-Point Axiom
Cφ↔ E(φ ∧ Cφ)
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along with an Induction Rule
φ→ E(ψ ∧ φ)
φ→ Cψ
that captures the greatest solution of the corresponding fixed-point equation
[Fagin et al., 1995].
This kind of system is not easy to work with — it has no traditional cut
elimination and, consequently, there is little hope for automatic proof search.
Dating back to the 70s, McCarthy undertakes alternative attempts to
describe common knowledge axiomatically [McCarthy et al., 1979], but this
work wasn’t continued.
An approach similar to McCarthy’s was taken in S4Jn and is actively being
developed at this time. S4Jn is strictly weaker than system S4
C
n [Antonakos,
2006], but seems sufficient for all practical applications. S4Jn axiomatics allow
standard methods of proof theory, and allows the drawing of parallels with
Artemov’s logic of explicit proofs LP.
There is an automatic prover for multi-agent logic with justified knowl-
edge S4Jn in the MetaPRL logical framework [Bryukhov, 2005; Bryukhov,
2006]; its output is a Gentzen-style cut-free proof. Such proofs can be trans-
lated into S4nLP proofs with justified knowledge modality replaced by evi-
dence terms. It would be interesting to make such a translation automat-
ically, and this is what we do. Since known translation to Gentzen-style
proofs might result in exponential blow-up of the proof length, we’ll be look-
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ing for a translation to Hilbert-style proofs, which is known to result in only
a polynomial blow-up in an S4-to-LP case [Brezhnev and Kuznets, 2006].
2.2 Overview of S4nLP logic
S4nLP is a multi-agent logic of evidence-based knowledge, with knowledge
operators of n agents K1, K2, K3, . . . , Kn, and evidence assertions of the form
t : A, where t is an evidence term and A is a formula. Evidence term t is
built from constants a, b, c, . . . and variables x, y, z, . . . with the help of binary
operators ‘·’ (application), ‘+’ (union), and unary operator ‘!’ (inspection).
Formulas of S4nLP are defined by the following grammar:
⊥ | S | A → B | A ∧ B | A ∨ B | ¬A | KiA | t : A, where t is an evidence
and S is a sentence variable.
Evidence operation has highest precedence, and all other connectives have
standard precedence order.
Hilbert style axioms and rules of S4nLP:
I. Classical propositional logic
A1. A→ (B → A)
A2. (A→ (B → C))→ ((A→ B)→ (A→ C))
A3. A ∧B → A
A4. A ∧B → B
45
A5. A→ (B → (A ∧B))
A6. A→ (A ∨B)
A7. B → (A ∨B)
A8. (A→ C)→ ((B → C)→ (A ∨B → C))
A9. (A→ B)→ ((A→ ¬B)→ ¬A)
A10. ¬¬A→ A
R1. (A→ B), A ` B (modus ponens)
II. Knowledge principles
B1i. Ki(A→ B)→ (KiA→ KiB)
B2i. KiA→ A
B3i. KiA→ KiKiA (positive introspection)
R2i. A ` KiA (knowledge generalization)
for each individual knowledge operator Ki.
III. Evidence Principles
E1. s : (A→ B)→ (t : A→ (s · t) : B) (application)
E2. t : A→!t : (t : A) (inspection)
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E3. s : A→ (s+ t) : A, t : A→ (s+ t) : A (union)
E4. t : A→ A (reflexivity)
R3. ` c : A, where A is an axiom from I-IV and c is a proof constant
(evidence for axioms).
IV. Principle connecting evidence and knowledge
C1. t : A→ KiA (undeniability of evidence)
All axioms are schemas in the language of S4nLP. All rules are applied
across sections I - IV. The system is closed under substitutions of evidence
terms for evidence variables and formulas for propositional variables. Deduc-
tion theorem Γ, A ` B ⇒ Γ ` A→ B holds.
Lemma 1 (Lifting Lemma) [Artemov, 2001; Artemov, 2004] IfA1, . . . , An, y1 :
B1, . . . , ym : Bm ` F , then for some evidence term t = t(x1, . . . , xn, y1, . . . , ym),
x1 : A1, . . . , xn : An, y1 : B1, . . . , ym : Bm ` t(x1, . . . , xm, y1, . . . , yn) : F
Lemma 2 For any proof variables ~xi and any formulas ~Bi, there exists a
proof term s = s(x1, . . . , xn) such that
LP ` x1 : B1 ∧ . . . ∧ xn : Bn → s(x1, . . . , xn) : (x1 : B1 ∧ . . . xn : Bn).
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2.3 Overview of S4Jn system
S4Jn is a forgetful evidence-based logic with n + 1 modalities K1, . . . , Kn, J .
JA reads as ‘A is justified’ and is a forgetful projection of evidence assertion
t : A.
The forgetful version of undeniability of evidence principle for S4Jn is
JA→ KiA, for all i = 1, . . . , n.
Below we present a Gentzen-style formulation [Troelstra and Schwicht-
enberg, 2000] of S4Jn called S4
J
nG [Artemov, 2004; Brezhnev and Kuznets,
2006].
A sequent is a pair of finite sets of S4Jn formulas presented as Γ ⇒ ∆.
Axioms of Gentzen-style S4Jn are the sequents S,Γ ⇒ ∆, S and ⊥,Γ ⇒ ∆,
where S is a propositional variable.
Gentzen style rules of S4Jn:
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Γ⇒ ∆, A
¬A,Γ⇒ ∆ (¬ ⇒)
A,Γ⇒ ∆
Γ⇒ ∆,¬A (⇒ ¬)
A,B,Γ⇒ ∆
A ∧B,Γ⇒ ∆ (∧ ⇒)
Γ⇒ ∆, A Γ⇒ ∆, B
Γ⇒ ∆, A ∧B (⇒ ∧)
A,Γ⇒ ∆ B,Γ⇒ ∆
A ∨B,Γ⇒ ∆ (∨ ⇒)
Γ⇒ ∆, A,B
Γ⇒ ∆, A ∨B (⇒ ∨)
Γ⇒ ∆, A B,Γ⇒ A
A→ B,Γ⇒ ∆ (→⇒)
A,Γ⇒ ∆, B
Γ⇒ ∆, A→ B (⇒→)




JΓ,∆,Π⇒ Σ,A (⇒ )
where  ∈ {K1, . . . , Kn, J} and {A1, . . . , Am} = {A1, . . . ,Am}.
2.4 Main Definitions and Facts
Our goal is to replace justifiable knowledge, modality J , with explicit jus-
tifications, i.e., proof polynomials (proof terms). In other words, instead
of knowing that something is ‘justified,’ we would like to have its actual
justification. An algorithm that accomplishes this is called realization pro-
cedure. An exponential version of such an algorithm was first described for
LP in [Artemov, 1995], and a polynomial version was given in [Brezhnev and
Kuznets, 2006]. Its extension to S4nLP is relatively straightforward. Since
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this procedure is quite tedious, it would be nice to have a program that
performs this realization for us.
Before we describe the algorithm, allow us to present some definitions
and state the theorems and facts that we will need.
Definition 1 To realize a modal formula F from S4Jn in S4nLP means to
substitute proof polynomials for all occurrences of J in F .
Definition 2 A realization r is called normal if all negative occurrences of
J are realized by proof variables.
We limit ourselves to normal realizations only. Such a limitation arises
from the fact that negative occurrences of J modalities constitute argu-
ments of Skolem functions. Arguments emerge from universal quantifiers
and Skolem functions from existential quantifiers. [Artemov, 1995; Artemov,
2001; Brezhnev and Kuznets, 2006].
Example 3 Consider a formula JA → JB. This can be read as “for any
proof of A there exists a proof of B” or ∀x.Proof(x,A) → ∃y.Proof(y,B),
where x is a proof variable (supplied) and y is a proof polynomial which may
depend on x. The skolemized form of this formula is x : A→ f(x) : B, and
x is an argument of Skolem function f .
Thus it is reasonable to demand that these Skolem arguments are real-
ized by proof variables rather than by more complicated proof terms (proof
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polynomials).
Realization theorem. [Artemov, 2004] There is an algorithm that given
a cut-free S4Jn-derivation of a formula ϕ, retrieves a S4nLP-derivation of a
formula ψ such that (ψ)◦ = ϕ.
Translation ◦ maps t : ϕ to Jϕ and commutes with all other connectives.
The algorithm presented is of exponential complexity.
There are two earlier realization algorithms for S4 and LP. In [Artemov,
1995] the realization algorithm produces a Hilbert-style derivation, and in
[Artemov, 2001] the realization procedure produces a Gentzen-style deriva-
tion. Kuznets showed that both variants give an exponential blow-up of
the derivation size and Brezhnev suggested a modification [Brezhnev and
Kuznets, 2006] to the procedure from [Artemov, 1995] that produces at most
a polynomial overhead. In [Brezhnev and Kuznets, 2006], the realization
theorem states that if S4 ` F , then LP ` F r for some normal realization
and a new realization algorithm that produces proof polynomials of at most
quadratic length is given. The realization algorithm described below utilizes
all of these results.
2.5 Realization Algorithm
The realization procedure works by induction on the depth of the S4Jn deriva-
tion tree. It runs through the Getzen-style proof of a formula F in S4Jn and
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simultaneously constructs a realization and Hilbert-style proof of the realized
formula. We also keep track of all instances of the evidence for axiom rule
R3 used in this Hilbert-style proof, i.e., of constant specification.
We start with definitions of positive and negative occurrences of modality
J in a formula and in a sequent, as adapted from [Artemov, 1995]:
• An indicated (outer) occurrence of J in JF is positive;
• A corresponding occurrence of J in F and G→ F , G ∨ F , G ∧ F , JF ,
and Γ⇒ ∆, F has the same polarity;
• Corresponding occurrences of J in F and ¬F , F → G, and F,Γ ⇒ ∆
have opposite polarities.
In a cut-free derivation, the rules respect polarities. Occurrences of J




All occurrences of J-modality in a given derivation tree of⇒ F are divided
into families of related occurrences. Each occurrence of J in a side formula
G (i.e., from Γ and ∆) in the premise of the rule is related only to the
corresponding occurrence of J in G in the conclusion of the rule. Similarly,
each occurrence of J in an active formula of the rule, i.e., in a formula in the
premise that is transformed by the rule, is related only to the corresponding
occurrence of J in the principal formula of the rule, i.e. in the result of
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transformation. For example, in the (J ⇒)-rule, formulas A and JA in the
premise sequent are the active formulas, and formula JA in the conclusion
sequent is the principal formula. This relationship is extended by reflexivity
and transitivity. Therefore all related occurrences are naturally split into
families of related occurrences.
Since rules in the cut-free Gentzen system respect polarities, each family
consists of J’s of the same polarity. We call a family positive if it consists of
positive J’s, and negative if it consists of negative J’s.
J modalities from the same family correspond to the same occurrence of J
in the proof, so we realize them by the same proof polynomial that explicates
this J. In addition, due to the normality condition, all J’s from a negative
family have to be realized by the same proof variable.
Proofs (derivations) of formulas in a Getzen system, S4JnG in particular,
can be viewed as derivation trees. Nodes are triples: the current sequent,
name of the rule and the principal formulas, and axioms as leaves. It imposes
a tree structure on each family of J’s, with leaves as those nodes where J ’s
of a particular family are first introduced (at a leaf of the derivation tree or
in a (⇒ ) rule).
Comment: It is not necessary to carry sequents in every node - they can
be reconstructed from rule names, principle formulas, and full sequents at
the root. The implemented realization algorithm uses the full information,
whereas the gen prover (see below) produces a proof in the latter, more
compact, format.
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A positive family of J ’s is essential if at least one of its leaves corresponds
to a principal J in a (⇒ ) rule, and is non-essential otherwise.
Realization algorithm:
(by recursion on the derivation tree structure)
In our system S4JnG, there are only three ways of introducing new J-
modalities:
• by an axiom;
• inside a formula by which a sequent is ‘weakened’ in a (⇒ ) rule;
• the outer J in the principal formula of a (⇒ ) rule.
Let us enumerate all (⇒ J) rules in the derivation tree and associate pro-
visional variable ui with the principal J of the i-th rule. All of the provisional
variables will be replaced with proof polynomials by the end of the algorithm.
Stage 1 Every negative family and non-essential family of J’s is realized by
a fresh proof variable. All J ’s from such a family will be realized by a proof
variable corresponding to that family.
Stage 2 Pick an essential positive family of J ’s. Enumerate all the occur-
rences of (⇒ ) rules that introduce J ’s from this family as the principles:
i1 < i2 < . . . < ik. All such J’s are initially realized by provisional term
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ui1 + ui2 + . . . uik , where addition is associated to the left and ui’s are fresh
provisional variables.
We also initialize a substitution σ, which acts on these provisional vari-
ables, to be the empty substitution. At the end of the realization procedure,
this substitution will assign a certain proof polynomial to each provisional
variable. As a result, essential positive J’s will also be realized by proof poly-
nomials that contain no provisional variables.
Next, each S4Jn formula G occurring in the sequent derivation is translated
into an S4nLP formula Gr as follows: each occurrence of J in G is replaced
by a proof polynomial tσ that possibly contains provisional variables, where
t is the term realizing the family of that J , and σ is the current state of the
substitution acting on provisional variables. This substitution is appended
during the realization procedure, namely, during processing of (⇒ ) rules.
Stage 3 For each sequent in the initial derivation we will construct
• an S4nLP formula C that corresponds to that sequent,
• a proof polynomial t that contains no provisional variables, and
• a Hilbert-style derivation of t : C
recursively on the structure of the derivation tree of ⇒ F .
Kuznets and Brezhnev had the idea to use the polynomials t. They are
used while processing the (⇒ ) rules of the initial S4Jn derivation, and are
a vital part of eliminating exponential blow-up.
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Base: Let C be a sequent formula. Any sequent formula Γ ⇒ ∆, where
Γ = {A1, . . . , An}, and ∆ = {B1, . . . , Bm},
A1, A2, . . . , An ⇒ B1, B2, . . . , Bm
is translated into a formula
(. . . (Ar1 ∧ Ar2) ∧ . . .) ∧ Arn → (. . . (Br1 ∨Br2) ∨ . . .) ∨Brm .
The antecedent and the consequent of a sequent are multisets, so the order
of formulas is irrelevant in both, but normal Hilbert-style operations do not
possess such freedom. Thus we need to force some order on Ari ’s and on B
r
i ’s,
so we can use any ordering that allows efficient sorting. This ordering should
be uniform for all sequents. This is important for Cook and Reckhow’s idea
[Cook and Reckhow, 1974] of implementing each step of Gentzen-style deriva-
tion by several steps of the corresponding Hilbert-style derivation, overwise
the formulas on different branches of the tree might not match. The lexico-
graphical order is a natural one.
An empty consequent constitutes empty disjunction and is translated as
⊥. An empty antecedent constitutes empty conjunction and is translated as
>. Therefore ⇒ F is translated as > → F r.
Translation of two axioms of S4JnG:
(A) A1, . . . , Ai−1, S, Ai, . . . , An ⇒ B1, . . . , Bj−1, S, Bj, . . . , Bm
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is translated as
Ar1∧ . . .∧Ari−1∧S∧Ari ∧ . . .∧Arn → Br1 ∨ . . .∨Brj−1∨S∨Brj ∨ . . .∨Brm,
in particular, S ⇒ S is translated as Sr → Sr;
(B) ⊥, A1, . . . , An ⇒ B1, . . . , Bm
is translated as
⊥ ∧ Ar1 ∧ . . . ∧ Arn → Br1 ∨ . . . ∨Brm;
in particular, ⊥ ⇒ is translated as ⊥ → ⊥.




l ’s are already ordered alphabeti-
cally, and ⊥ is the first symbol of the alphabet, disjunctions and conjunctions
are associated to the left.)
Each translated implication C of this type is clearly derivable in S4nLP.
After application of the Lifting Lemma to this derivation, we get a ground
proof polynomial s and a derivation of s : C.
Induction Step:




Let C and C ′ be translations of Γ ⇒ ∆ and Γ′ ⇒ ∆′ respectively. By
induction hypothesis, there is a term tC and a derivation lC of tC : C. By
propositional reasoning, there is a derivation of C → C ′. Using the Lifting
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Lemma, we get a ground term tR and a derivation lR of tR : (C → C ′). Con-
catenating lC with lR and appending the result with the following sequence
. . . (derivation lR)
n. tR : (C → C ′)
. . . (derivation lC)
m. tC : C
m+1. tR : (C → C ′)→ (tC : C → tR · tC : C ′) (axiom E1)
m+2. tC : C → tR · tC : C ′ (MP from n and m+1)
m+3. tR · tC : C ′ (MP from m and m+2) ,
we obtain the term tC′ = tR · tC and the derivation lC′ of tR · tC : C ′.
A case of a propositional rule with two premises are handled in a similar
way.
Let us consider (⇒) rule for Γ = {B1, . . . , Bn}, and ∆ = {D1, . . . , Dm}:
A, JA,B1, . . . , Bn ⇒ D1, . . . , Dm
JA,B1, . . . , Bn ⇒ D1, . . . , Dm
(⇒) .
Without loss of generality, let’s assume that the translation of the premise
is
C = Br1 ∧ . . . ∧Bri−1 ∧ Ar ∧Bri ∧ . . . ∧Brj−1 ∧ x : Ar ∧Brj ∧ . . . ∧Brn → D,
where D = Dr1 ∨ . . .∨Drm and x is the proof variable associated with the
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negative family of the outer J-modality in JA. Then the translation of the
conclusion is
C ′ = Br1 ∧ . . . ∧Brj−1 ∧ x : Ar ∧Brj ∧ . . . ∧Brn → D.
Since S4nLP ` x : Ar → Ar (reflexivity principle E4), it is easy to derive
C → C ′. Then, using the Lifting Lemma, we obtain a ground term t(⇒)
and a derivation l(⇒) of t(⇒) : (C → C ′). The rest is the same as with the
one-premise propositional rules.
The only rule that is treated differently is (⇒ ), which includes two
cases: (⇒ Ki) and (⇒ J). Let’s consider the first one: for Γ = {B1, . . . , Bn},
∆ = {D1, . . . , Dm} , Σ = {E1, . . . , Eo}, and Π = {A1, . . . , Ar}
JΓ, Ki∆⇒ A
JΓ, Ki∆,Π⇒ Σ, KiA
(⇒ Ki) .
Without loss of generality, let’s assume that the translation of the premise
is
C = ~x : Γr ∧Ki∆r → Ar
and ~x = (x1, . . . , xn), where xi are distinct proof variables associated with
the negative families of the outer J-modality in JΓ.
Then the translation of the conclusion is
C ′ = ~x : Γr ∧Ki∆r ∧ Πr → Σr ∨KiAr .
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By induction hypothesis, we have a term tC and a derivation lC of
tC : (~x : Γ
r ∧Ki : ~Dr → Ar)
. . . (derivation lC)
n. tC : (~x : Γ
r ∧Ki∆r → Ar)
n+1.tC : (~x : Γ
r ∧Ki∆r → Ar)→ Ki(~x : Γr ∧Ki∆r → Ar) (axiom C1)
n+2.Ki(~x : Γ
r ∧Ki∆r → Ar) (MP from n and n+1)
n+3.Ki(~x : Γ
r ∧Ki∆r → Ar)→ (Ki(~x : Γr ∧Ki∆r)→ KiAr) (axiom B1i)
n+4.Ki(~x : Γ






















l )→ KiAr (syllogism from n+4 and n+5)
n+7.xj : B
r
j → Kixj : Brj (an easy S4nLP fact)
n+8.KiD
r












































l ) ∧ Π→ Σ ∨KiAr
(propositional reasoning from n+10)










l ) ∧ Π→ Σ ∨KiAr)
(Lifting Lemma from n+11)
We obtained the ground term tn+11 and a derivation of tn+11 : (C → C ′).
Now, let us consider the (⇒ J) rule:
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for ∆ = {D1, . . . , Dm} , Σ = {E1, . . . , Eo}, and Π = {A1, . . . , Ar}
JD1, . . . , JDm ⇒ A
JD1, . . . , JDm, A1, . . . , Ar ⇒ E1, . . . , Eo, JA
(⇒ J) .
All J’s in JDi’s are negative and belong to different families, so they are
realized by distinct proof variables xi’s. Let k be the number of this (⇒ J)
rule and let its family be realized by us1 + . . . + uk + . . . usl . By induction
hypothesis, we have a term tC and a derivation lC of
tC : (x1 : D
r
1 ∧ . . . ∧ xm : Drm → Ar).
By Lemma 2, we construct a term s = s(x1, . . . , xm) and a derivation l1 of
x1 : D
r
1 ∧ . . . ∧ xm : Drm → s : (x1 : Dr1 ∧ . . . ∧ xm : Drm).
Note that s does not contain any provisional variables. Now it is easy to
append derivations lC and l1 (we’ll use vector notation for conjunction):
. . . (derivation lC)
n. tC : (~x : ~Dr → Ar)
. . . (derivation l1)
m. ~x : ~Dr → s : (~x : ~Dr)
m+1.tC : (~x : ~Dr → Ar)→ (s : (~x : ~Dr)→ tC · s : Ar) (axiom E1)
m+2. s : (~x : ~Dr)→ tC · s : Ar (MP from n and m+1)
m+3. ~x : ~Dr → tC · s : Ar (syllogism from m and m+2)
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. . . (using axiom E3 several times)
k. ~x : ~Dr → (us1σ + . . .+ tC · s+ . . . uslσ) : Ar.
Moreover this derivation is easy to append to obtain derivation l2 of a
formula C ′ that (modulo permutations) looks like
~x : ~Dr ∧ ~A→ ~E ∨ (us1σ + . . .+ tC · s+ . . . uslσ) : Ar
(here ~x : ~Dr and ~A stand for conjunctions, and ~E for disjunctions).
We then use the Lifting Lemma to reproduce a ground term tC′ and a
derivation lC′ of
tC′ : (~x : ~Dr ∧ ~A→ ~E ∨ (us1σ + . . .+ tC · s+ . . . uslσ) : Ar) .
While lifting l2 [Brezhnev and Kuznets, 2006], there is no need to lift its
initial part lC since the only formula we use for the second part is tC : (~x :
~Dr → Ar); this formula is easily lifted by adding to lC the following two
formulas:
tC : (~x : ~Dr → Ar)→!tC : tC : (~x : ~Dr → Ar), and
!tC : tC : (~x : ~Dr → Ar),
the latter being the desired lifted version. This procedure produces a
ground term because tC is ground. Also, this modification renders the whole
procedure polynomial in the size of the original S4Jn-derivation. In the orig-
inal algorithm [Artemov, 1995], each time a (⇒ ) rule is processed, most
formulas in the initial derivation are replaced by three formulas in the lifted
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one, which leads to exponential growth in the number of (⇒ ) rules. We
then append σ by a new substitution: σ = σ+ {uk ← tC · s}, and apply this
substitution throughout the derivation (S4nLP is known to be closed under
substitutions). After that, there are no occurrences of uk remaining in the
derivation. As a result, we eliminated one provisional variable.
Final Touch: At the end of the procedure, the entire derivation tree of
⇒ F is translated – all (⇒ ) rules have been processed and there are
no provisional variables remaining. Thus, F r is simply an S4nLP formula.
Moreover, we have a Hilbert-style derivation lt of t : (> → F r) for some
ground term t. To acquire F r, we do the following:
. . . (derivation lt)
n. t : (> → F r)
n+1. t : (> → F r)→ (> → F r) (axiom E4)
n+2. (> → F r) (MP from n and n+1)
n+3. >
n+4. F r (MP from n+2 and n+3).
2.6 Notes on implementation
First, we tried to implement the realization algorithm in Prolog. The rea-
soning behind the use of Prolog is that in proof search problem, Prolog im-
plementations greatly outperform other languages in terms of compactness.
For example, provers for intuitionistic logic and S4 can fit on a few pages,
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whereas OCaml prover requires many pages of code. This makes Prolog ideal
for experimental work because altering a page or two of code is much easier
than altering many thousands of lines. We wanted to see if our problem at
hand could also benefit from the use of Prolog. But it quickly turned out
that either our expertise in Prolog is lacking or Prolog is not the right tool
for the job.
The first challenge that we faced was evaluating box families. This in-
volves assigning a family identifier to each box. Proofs have branches, and
families grow by transitive extension. We saw two options: either keep fam-
ilies as variables and let Prolog unify them, or assign a unique identifier to
each box and maintain a disjoint set of sets (families) of box identifiers that
are related (belong to the same family). This disjoint set has to support the
following operations: addition of new representatives to sets, merging of sets,
and search for a set by its representative. The latter approach was used in
our OCaml version of the algorithm, but we wanted to utilize Prolog’s powers
of unification, search, and backtracking. We tried the former approach but it
was not going very well, perhaps due to our lack of expertise. It was not clear
how to terminate family variables with literals (and, maybe, operations), so
that families from two branches unify, if needed. Families could not remain
as variables forever — they had to end up as unique ground terms for the
next stage of the realization procedure.
Another problem that we faced with Prolog was its lack of record/structure
type. When data items become 6-dimensional tuples with two dimensions
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being 4-dimensional tuples, it starts to feel too verbose.
We ended up implementing the procedure in OCaml. The biggest hurdle
was, of course, implementing the part that is considered trivial on paper:
evaluating box families. As previously stated, we used disjoint set of sets
of unique identifiers given to each box. What actually occurs, is that each
box is replaced with Pr(Provisional, F ) where Provisional is this unique
identifier. The algorithm recursively walks over the proof tree, assigns these
identifiers, and collects information about which identifiers fall into which
family. At each step representing application of a rule, we have to track how
each formula above the line (of the rule) was transformed and then transform
the formulas below the line accordingly.
The next major simplification step the paper took is that of skipping
much Hilbert-style reasoning. We do the same for all classical reasoning
that justifies a shift from rule assumptions to rule conclusion; we say that
there is a (fresh) proof constant justifying the implication, and deduce such
implications using reflexivity axiom t : A→ A.
The rest is a more or less straightforward implementation of the paper
algorithm, extended to a multi-agent case.
Using OCaml had a certain convenience — there was already an S4Jn prover
[Bryukhov, 2006] in MetaPRL Logical Framework, which is also implemented
in OCaml. This prover produces Gentzen-style proofs, exactly what polyno-
mial realization procedures needs. It was trivial to connect them.
We also used Ocsigen web server (written in OCaml, (http://ocsigen.
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org)) to expose our work to casual users over the Web http://yegor.org/
s4nlp/theorem.
At this point, we realized that the produced proofs were way too long,
both in the number of steps and the length of produced formulas. We par-
tially address both.
First of all, as suggested by Melvin Fitting, we introduced two one-step
rules: Deduction and Lifting. After each application of the Lifting lemma
or Deduction Theorem, we retain the full chain of reasoning for validation
purposes, but collapse them for purposes of display. Therefore, one sees the
following:
k. A1, . . . , Am, . . . , An ` B
k + 1. Am+1, . . . , An ` Am → . . .→ A1 → B (by Deduction)
and
k. x1 : A1, . . . , xn : An ` B
k + 1. x1 : A1, . . . , xn : An ` c(x1, . . . , xn) : B (by Lifting).
Second, we assigned fresh (shortcut) constants to each proof term ap-
pearing in the proof and with length more than 5. We list these assignments
at the end of the proof and provide a hyperlink from each occurrence of such
a constant to its definition.
We also inserted dummy steps to mark the boundaries between individual
Gentzen proofs steps and certain stages of⇒  rule realization. Such dummy
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steps are labeled with Gentzen rules or realization stage names instead of
Hilbert rules or axioms. These dummy rules are also rendered with normal
font size and all intermediate steps – with a smaller font.
2.7 Examples
In this section, we will go over a few simple examples first, followed by several
classical puzzles.
2.7.1 Graphs
Some of the examples of realization are accompanied with the three types of
graphs.
The first graph shows the growth of the number of steps in a Hilbert-
style proof as a function of the number of steps in the original Gentzen-style
proof. According to [Brezhnev and Kuznets, 2006] we should observe O(n2)
- dependency on this graph.
The second graph shows the growth of the total length of all formulas in
a Hilbert-style proof as a function of the total length of all formulas in the
original Gentzen-style proof. According to [Brezhnev and Kuznets, 2006] we
should observe O(n6) - dependency on this graph.
And the last graph shows the growth of the external (outer) terms’ sizes
in a Hilbert-style proof as a function of the number of steps in the original
Gentzen-style proof. According to [Brezhnev and Kuznets, 2006] we should
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observe O(n2) - dependency on this graph.
One can see the bumps on the graphs. The bumps are the result of (⇒ )
rule realization. We observe that all other rules are linear in the number of
steps.
When a Gentzen-style proof has branches, we show them in different
colors, and the longest branch on the graph goes all the way to the root of
the proof.
Now let us proceed to specific examples.
2.7.2 Self-Referential Example
J¬(s → Js) ⇒ (self referential example, [Brezhnev and Kuznets, 2006]).
The linearized Gentzen S4Jn proof is
(Axiom)
a, J¬(a→ Ja)⇒ Ja, a
(⇒→)
J¬(a→ Ja)⇒ a→ Ja, a
(¬ ⇒)




a, J¬(a→ Ja)⇒ Ja
(⇒→)
J¬(a→ Ja)⇒ (a→ Ja)
(¬ ⇒)
¬(a→ Ja), J¬(a→ Ja)⇒
(⇒)
J¬(a→ Ja)⇒
A corresponding Hilbert-style S4nLP proof of this sequent is given below,
where Tt stand for constant terms for certain propositional tautologies and,
in the case of ( ⇒) rule, simple propositional consequences of t : A → A
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axiom. C1 through C20 are witnesses for axioms; the numbering of the axioms
can be found in Appendix B.
1. ` (V1 : (¬(s→ (C41!V1) : (s)))→!V1 : (V1 : (¬(s→ (C41!V1) : (s)))))
[ Axiom 14 ]
2. ` (V1 : (¬(s→ (C41!V1) : (s)))→!V1 : (V1 : (¬(s→ (C41!V1) : (s)))))
[ lemma3, 1 hyp ]
3. ` Tt : (((s ∧ V1 : (¬(s→ (C41!V1) : (s))))→ (s ∨ (C41!V1) : (s))))
[ CS for classical tautology or t : A→ A]
4. ` Tt : (((s ∧V1 : (¬(s→ (C41!V1) : (s))))→ (s ∨ (C41!V1) : (s))))
[ Gentzen Axiom ]
5. ` Tt : ((((s ∧ V1 : (¬(s→ (C41!V1) : (s))))→ (s ∨ (C41!V1) : (s)))→
(V1 : (¬(s→ (C41!V1) : (s)))→ (s ∨ (s→ (C41!V1) : (s))))))
[ CS for classical tautology or t : A→ A ]
6. ` (Tt : ((((s ∧ V1 : (¬(s→ (C41!V1) : (s))))→ (s ∨ (C41!V1) : (s)))→
(V1 : (¬(s→ (C41!V1) : (s)))→ (s ∨ (s→ (C41!V1) : (s))))))→
(Tt : (((s ∧ V1 : (¬(s→ (C41!V1) : (s))))→ (s ∨ (C41!V1) : (s))))→
(TtT t) : ((V1 : (¬(s→ (C41!V1) : (s)))→ (s ∨ (s→ (C41!V1) : (s)))))))
[ Axiom 12 ]
7. ` (Tt : (((s ∧ V1 : (¬(s→ (C41!V1) : (s))))→ (s ∨ (C41!V1) : (s))))→
(TtT t) : ((V1 : (¬(s→ (C41!V1) : (s)))→ (s ∨ (s→ (C41!V1) : (s))))))
[ MP on 5 and 6 ]
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8. ` (TtT t) : ((V1 : (¬(s→ (C41!V1) : (s)))→ (s ∨ (s→ (C41!V1) : (s)))))
[ MP on 4 and 7]
9. ` (TtTt) : ((V1 : (¬(s→ (C41!V1) : (s)))→ (s ∨ (s→ (C41!V1) : (s)))))
[ by (⇒→) ]
10. ` Tt : (((V1 : (¬(s→ (C41!V1) : (s)))→ (s ∨ (s→ (C41!V1) : (s))))→
((¬(s→ (C41!V1) : (s)) ∧ V1 : (¬(s→ (C41!V1) : (s))))→ s)))
[ CS for classical tautology or t : A→ A ]
11. ` (Tt : (((V1 : (¬(s→ (C41!V1) : (s)))→ (s ∨ (s→ (C41!V1) : (s))))→
((¬(s→ (C41!V1) : (s)) ∧ V1 : (¬(s→ (C41!V1) : (s))))→ s)))→
((TtT t) : ((V1 : (¬(s→ (C41!V1) : (s)))→ (s ∨ (s→ (C41!V1) : (s)))))→
(Tt(TtT t)) : (((¬(s→ (C41!V1) : (s)) ∧ V1 : (¬(s→ (C41!V1) : (s))))→ s))))
[ Axiom 12 ]
12. ` ((TtT t) : ((V1 : (¬(s→ (C41!V1) : (s)))→ (s ∨ (s→ (C41!V1) : (s)))))→
(Tt(TtT t)) : (((¬(s→ (C41!V1) : (s)) ∧ V1 : (¬(s→ (C41!V1) : (s))))→ s)))
[ MP on 10 and 11 ]
13. ` (Tt(TtT t)) : (((¬(s→ (C41!V1) : (s)) ∧ V1 : (¬(s→ (C41!V1) : (s))))→ s))
[ MP on 9 and 12 ]
14. ` (Tt(TtTt)) : (((¬(s→ (C41!V1) : (s)) ∧V1 : (¬(s→ (C41!V1) : (s))))→
s)) [ by (¬ ⇒) ]
15. ` Tt : ((((¬(s→ (C41!V1) : (s)) ∧ V1 : (¬(s→ (C41!V1) : (s))))→ s)→
(V1 : (¬(s→ (C41!V1) : (s)))→ s))) [ CS for classical tautology or t : A→ A ]
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16. ` (Tt : ((((¬(s→ (C41!V1) : (s)) ∧ V1 : (¬(s→ (C41!V1) : (s))))→ s)→
(V1 : (¬(s→ (C41!V1) : (s)))→ s)))→ ((Tt(TtT t)) : (((¬(s→ (C41!V1) : (s))∧
V1 : (¬(s→ (C41!V1) : (s))))→ s))→ C41 : ((V1 : (¬(s→ (C41!V1) : (s)))→ s))))
[ Axiom 12 ]
17. ` ((Tt(TtT t)) : (((¬(s→ (C41!V1) : (s)) ∧ V1 : (¬(s→ (C41!V1) : (s))))→
s))→ C41 : ((V1 : (¬(s→ (C41!V1) : (s)))→ s))) [ MP on 15 and 16 ]
18. ` C41 : ((V1 : (¬(s→ (C41!V1) : (s)))→ s)) [ MP on 14 and 17 ]
19. ` C41 : ((V1 : (¬(s→ (C41!V1) : (s)))→ s)) [ by ⇒ ]
20. ` (C41 : ((V1 : (¬(s→ (C41!V1) : (s)))→ s))→ (!V1 : (V1 : (¬(s→
(C41!V1) : (s))))→ (C41!V1) : (s))) [ Axiom 12 ]
21. ` (!V1 : (V1 : (¬(s→ (C41!V1) : (s))))→ (C41!V1) : (s)) [ MP on 19 and 20 ]
22. ` ((!V1 : (V1 : (¬(s→ (C41!V1) : (s))))→ (C41!V1) : (s))→ (V1 : (¬(s→
(C41!V1) : (s)))→ (!V1 : (V1 : (¬(s→ (C41!V1) : (s))))→ (C41!V1) : (s))))
[ Axiom 1 ]
23. ` (V1 : (¬(s→ (C41!V1) : (s)))→ (!V1 : (V1 : (¬(s→ (C41!V1) : (s))))→
(C41!V1) : (s))) [ MP on 21 and 22 ]
24. ` ((V1 : (¬(s→ (C41!V1) : (s)))→ (!V1 : (V1 : (¬(s→ (C41!V1) : (s))))→
(C41!V1) : (s)))→ ((V1 : (¬(s→ (C41!V1) : (s)))→!V1 : (V1 : (¬(s→
(C41!V1) : (s)))))→ (V1 : (¬(s→ (C41!V1) : (s)))→ (C41!V1) : (s)))) [ Axiom 2 ]
25. ` ((V1 : (¬(s→ (C41!V1) : (s)))→!V1 : (V1 : (¬(s→ (C41!V1) : (s)))))→
(V1 : (¬(s→ (C41!V1) : (s)))→ (C41!V1) : (s)))
[ MP on 23 and 24 ]
26. ` (V1 : (¬(s→ (C41!V1) : (s)))→ (C41!V1) : (s)) [ MP on 2 and 25 ]
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27. ` (V1 : (¬(s→ (C41!V1) : (s)))→ (C41!V1) : (s)) [ syllogism ]
28. ` Tt : (((V1 : (¬(s→ (C41!V1) : (s)))→ (C41!V1) : (s))→ ((s ∧ V1 : (¬(s→
(C41!V1) : (s))))→ (C41!V1) : (s)))) [ CS for classical tautology or t : A→ A ]
29. ` (Tt : (((V1 : (¬(s→ (C41!V1) : (s)))→ (C41!V1) : (s))→ ((s ∧ V1 : (¬(s→
(C41!V1) : (s))))→ (C41!V1) : (s))))→ ((V1 : (¬(s→ (C41!V1) : (s)))→
(C41!V1) : (s))→ ((s ∧ V1 : (¬(s→ (C41!V1) : (s))))→ (C41!V1) : (s))))
[ Axiom 13 ]
30. ` ((V1 : (¬(s→ (C41!V1) : (s)))→ (C41!V1) : (s))→ ((s ∧ V1 : (¬(s→
(C41!V1) : (s))))→ (C41!V1) : (s))) [ MP on 28 and 29 ]
31. ` ((s ∧ V1 : (¬(s→ (C41!V1) : (s))))→ (C41!V1) : (s)) [ MP on 27 and 30 ]
32. ` C42 : (((s ∧ V1 : (¬(s→ (C41!V1) : (s))))→ (C41!V1) : (s))) [ Lift ]
33. ` C42 : (((s ∧V1 : (¬(s→ (C41!V1) : (s))))→ (C41!V1) : (s))) [ by (⇒ J) ]
34. ` Tt : ((((s ∧ V1 : (¬(s→ (C41!V1) : (s))))→ (C41!V1) : (s))→ (V1 : (¬(s→
(C41!V1) : (s)))→ (s→ (C41!V1) : (s)))))
[ CS for classical tautology or t : A→ A ]
35. ` (Tt : ((((s ∧ V1 : (¬(s→ (C41!V1) : (s))))→ (C41!V1) : (s))→ (V1 : (¬(s→
(C41!V1) : (s)))→ (s→ (C41!V1) : (s)))))→ (C42 : (((s ∧ V1 : (¬(s→
(C41!V1) : (s))))→ (C41!V1) : (s)))→ C43 : ((V1 : (¬(s→ (C41!V1) : (s)))→
(s→ (C41!V1) : (s)))))) [ Axiom 12 ]
36. ` (C42 : (((s ∧ V1 : (¬(s→ (C41!V1) : (s))))→ (C41!V1) : (s)))→
C43 : ((V1 : (¬(s→ (C41!V1) : (s)))→ (s→ (C41!V1) : (s))))) [ MP on 34 and 35 ]
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37. ` C43 : ((V1 : (¬(s→ (C41!V1) : (s)))→ (s→ (C41!V1) : (s))))
[ MP on 33 and 36 ]
38. ` C43 : ((V1 : (¬(s→ (C41!V1) : (s)))→ (s→ (C41V1) : (s))))
[ by (⇒→) ]
39. ` Tt : (((V1 : (¬(s→ (C41!V1) : (s)))→ (s→ (C41!V1) : (s)))→ ((¬(s→
(C41!V1) : (s)) ∧ V1 : (¬(s→ (C41!V1) : (s))))→ ⊥)))
[ CS for classical tautology or t : A→ A ]
40. ` (Tt : (((V1 : (¬(s→ (C41!V1) : (s)))→ (s→ (C41!V1) : (s)))→ ((¬(s→
(C41!V1) : (s)) ∧ V1 : (¬(s→ (C41!V1) : (s))))→ ⊥)))→ (C43 : ((V1 : (¬(s→
(C41!V1) : (s)))→ (s→ (C41!V1) : (s))))→ C44 : (((¬(s→
(C41!V1) : (s)) ∧ V1 : (¬(s→ (C41!V1) : (s))))→ ⊥)))) [ Axiom 12 ]
41. ` (C43 : ((V1 : (¬(s→ (C41!V1) : (s)))→ (s→ (C41!V1) : (s))))→
C44 : (((¬(s→ (C41!V1) : (s)) ∧ V1 : (¬(s→ (C41!V1) : (s))))→ ⊥)))
[ MP on 39 and 40 ]
42. ` C44 : (((¬(s→ (C41!V1) : (s)) ∧ V1 : (¬(s→ (C41!V1) : (s))))→ ⊥))
[ MP on 38 and 41 ]
43. ` C44 : (((¬(s→ (C41!V1) : (s)) ∧V1 : (¬(s→ (C41!V1) : (s))))→ ⊥))
[ by (¬ ⇒) ]
44. ` Tt : ((((¬(s→ (C41!V1) : (s)) ∧ V1 : (¬(s→ (C41!V1) : (s))))→ ⊥)→
(V1 : (¬(s→ (C41!V1) : (s)))→ ⊥))) [ CS for classical tautology or t : A→ A ]
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45. ` (Tt : ((((¬(s→ (C41!V1) : (s)) ∧ V1 : (¬(s→ (C41!V1) : (s))))→ ⊥)→
(V1 : (¬(s→ (C41!V1) : (s)))→ ⊥)))→ (C44 : (((¬(s→ (C41!V1) : (s))∧
V1 : (¬(s→ (C41!V1) : (s))))→ ⊥))→ C45 : ((V1 : (¬(s→ (C41!V1) : (s)))→ ⊥))))
[ Axiom 12 ]
46. ` (C44 : (((¬(s→ (C41!V1) : (s)) ∧ V1 : (¬(s→ (C41!V1) : (s))))→ ⊥))→
C45 : ((V1 : (¬(s→ (C41!V1) : (s)))→ ⊥))) [ MP on 44 and 45 ]
47. ` C45 : ((V1 : (¬(s→ (C41!V1) : (s)))→ ⊥)) [ MP on 43 and 46 ]
48. ` C45 : ((V1 : (¬(s→ (C41!V1) : (s)))→ ⊥)) [ by (⇒) ]
Constants:
C41 = (Tt (Tt (Tt T t)))
C42 = ((C13 !Tt) ((C2 (C1 (C12 !(Tt (Tt (Tt T t)))))) C14))
C43 = (Tt ((C13 !Tt) ((C2 (C1 (C12 !(Tt (Tt (Tt T t)))))) C14)))
C44 = (Tt (Tt ((C13 !Tt) ((C2 (C1 (C12 !(Tt (Tt (Tt T t)))))) C14))))







We also tried the following trivial examples. We do not show the proofs
because they are not particularly interesting.
• JA ∧ JB ⇒ J(A ∧B)
realization: (V0 : A ∧ V1 : B)→ (C42 ((C5 !V0) !V1)) : (A ∧B)
• J(A ∧B)⇒ JA ∧ JB
realization:
V0 : (A ∧B)→ (((T1 (Tt T t)) !V0) : A ∧ ((T4 (Tt T t)) !V 0) : B),
with proof constants for simple non-propositional tautologies:
T1 : ((A ∧B) ∧ V0 : (A ∧B)→ A)→ (V0 : (A ∧B)→ A),
T4 : ((A ∧B) ∧ V0 : (A ∧B)→ B)→ (V0 : (A ∧B)→ B)
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• J(A ∧B)⇒ JA
realization: V 0 : (A ∧B)→ ((T1 (Tt T t)) !V0) : A,
with proof constant for simple non-propositional tautologies:
T1 : ((A ∧B) ∧ V0 : (A ∧B)→ A)→ (V0 : (A ∧B)→ A)
• J(A ∨B)⇒ A,B
realization: V0 : (A ∨B)→ (A ∨B)
• JA ∨ JB ⇒ J(A ∨B)
realization:
(V0 : A ∨ V2 : B)→ (((Tt (T2 Tt)) !V0) + ((Tt (T5 Tt)) !V2)) : (A ∨B),
with proof constants for simple non-propositional tautologies:
T2 : ((A ∧ V0 : A)→ (A ∨B))→ (V0 : A→ (A ∨B)),
T5 : ((B ∧ V2 : B)→ (A ∨B))→ (V2 : B → (A ∨B))
• JA⇒ J(A ∨B)
realization: V0 : A→ ((Tt (T2 Tt)) !V0) : (A ∨B),
with proof constant for simple non-propositional tautologies:
T2 : ((A ∧ V0 : A)→ (A ∨B))→ (V0 : A→ (A ∨B))
• A,¬A⇒
realization: (A ∧ ¬A)→
• A⇒ ¬J¬A
77
realization: A→ ¬V0 : ( ¬A)
• ⇒ K1(A→ A)
realization: ¬⊥ → K1(A→ A)
• JA⇒ K1 A
realization: V0 : A→ K1 A
• K2 JA⇒ K1 A
realization: K2 V0 : A→ K1 A
• J K2 JA⇒ K1 A
realization: V2 : (K2 V0 : A)→ K1 A
2.7.4 Complexity of (⇒ ) rules
As mentioned, realization of the (⇒ ) rules causes complexity leaps in
derivations. We decided to take a look at the following two examples, hwere
there are many of J’s (K’s) are introduced to the right.
(A) JA→ JJJJJJJJJJJJA
The realized formula: V0 : A → C51!V0 : (C50!V0 : (C49!V0 : (C48!V0 :
(C47!V0 : (C46!V0 : (C45!V0 : ((C44!V0) : (C43!V0 : (C42!V0 : (C41!V0 :
(((Tt T t) !V0) : A))))))))))) .
Here are the graphs:
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It may not be visible on the second graph but in fact, the total length
of the formula here grows faster than a quadratic function and slower
than a cubic function.
(B) K1A→ K1K1K1K1K1K1K1K1K1K1K1K1K1K1A
Here are the graphs:
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2.7.5 Realization of the Wise Men Puzzle
The Wise Men puzzle is a classic puzzle studied in epistemology [Fagin et
al., 1995].
There are three wise men that can see each other. It is common knowledge
that there are two white hats and three red hats. The king puts a hat on the
head of each wise man and asks each in turn if he knows the color of the hat
on his head. The first wise man says that he does not know; the second man
says that he does not know; then the third wise man says that he knows.
The implementation of the Wise Men Puzzle: In the first three lines,
let m1 = Atom(add "m1")
let m2 = Atom(add "m2")
let m3 = Atom(add "m3") ,
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we create three propositional variables which are reserved for three wise men
wearing hats, where mi encodes that i
th man wears a red hat. Then, in
let kw i a = Or(Box(Modal i, a), Box(Modal i, Neg a)) ,
we create a helper-function kw(i,a) = Kia ∨ Ki¬a, where kw stands for
‘knows whether a or ¬a.’
For example, kw(1,m2) means that the first man knows whether or not
he wears a red hat. The next line,
let kao = And(kw 1 m2, And(kw 1 m3, And(kw 2 m1, kw 2 m3))) ,
creates a propositional helper-formula kao = (K1m2 ∨ K1¬m2) ∧ (K1m3 ∨
K1¬m3)∧ (K2m1∨K2¬m1)∧ (K2m3∨K2¬m3), where kao stands for ‘knows
about others,’ and states that m1 knows which hats m2 and m3 wear, and
m2 knows which hats m1 and m3 wear. We don’t state knowledge of the
third man because it is not needed for the deduction. Initially, we have the
following state:
let w0 = And(Box(Modal 0, kao), Box(Modal 0,
Or(m1, Or(m2, m3)))) ,
i.e., w0 = Jkao ∧ J(m1 ∨m2 ∨m3), which simply states that kao is common
knowledge and it is common knowledge that at least one of these men wears
a red hat. This is the way we encode the fact that there are two white and
three red hats, i.e., all three hats worn cannot be white.
After two men speak, the situation is:
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let w2 = And(w0, And(Box(Modal 0, Neg(kw 1 m1)),
Box(Modal 0, Neg(kw 2 m2)))) ,
i.e., w2 = w0∧J¬kw(1,m1)∧J¬kw(2,m2) — in addition to w0, it is common
knowledge that the first man does not know which hat he is wearing, and it




let h = w2 in
let c = Box(Modal 0, m3) in
let htm = formula2term h in
let ctm = formula2term c in .
Convert formulas w2 and Jm3 (it is common knowledge that third man wears
a red hat) into MetaPRL terms expected by gen prover:
let infs = gen_prover (Some 100) Jlogic_sig.S4 [htm] [ctm] in
where we ask gen prover to find a Gentzen-style S4Jn proof of w2⇒ Jm3.
gen prover returns a tree of rule names, possibly with parameters, but
our realization code expects a more complete form, namely a tree with full
information about sequents in every node/step of proof. So we convert former





printf "Filling in sequents\n";
let g = fill_sequents (FSet.singleton h)
(FSet.singleton c) inf in
realize g
| _ -> raise (Invalid_argument "resulting inference has more than
one root") .
the returned proof is fed to function fill sequents along with hypotheses
w2 and conclusion Jm3.
This more complete proof is provided to the function realize for the
realization itself. The resulting realized formula is(((
V0 : (kw 1 m2 ∧ (kw 1 m3 ∧ (kw 2 m1 ∧ kw 2 m3))) ∧
V1 : (m1 ∨ (m2 ∨m3))
)
∧ V2 : (¬(kw 1 m1))
)
∧ V3 : (¬(kw 2 m2))
)
→






The online realization can be seen at http://yegor.org/s4nlp/wisemen.
2.7.6 Realization of the Wise Girls Puzzle
Two Wise Girls puzzle [Yasugi and Oda, 2002] is a simpler variant of the
three wise men puzzle.
Two girls are seated one behind the other, facing the same direction. The
girls are put white hats on their heads. The first girl can see the second girls
hat but not conversely, and neither can see her own hat. The girls are told by
the observer that at least one of them wears a white hat. The observer then
asks the first girl: “Do you know if your hat is white?” She answers: “No!
I do not know.” The observer then asks the second girl the same question
and she answers: “Yes, I know.”
For this puzzle, the online realization procedure was used.
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Two propositional variables, g1 and g2, are used for two girls, where gi
stands for ‘ith girl wears a white hat.’ The list of hypotheses is
J (kw 1 g2), J(not kw 1 g1), J(g1 or g2) ,
where the first one means that it is common knowledge that the first girl
knows what color hat is on the second girl; the second one states that it is
common knowledge that the first girl does not know what color hat she is
wearing; and the last one states that it is common knowledge that at least
one of the girls wears a white hat.
The conclusion states that the second girl knows that she is wearing a
white hat:
K 2 g2 .
Provided with the above hypotheses and conclusion, the algorithm produces
a proof term. The realized formula is
(((V0 : (g1 ∨ g2) ∧ V1 : kw 1 g2) ∧ V2 : ¬(kw 1 g1)))→ K2 g2.
Graphs for the wise girls:
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2.7.7 Realization of the Muddy Children Puzzle
N children are playing together [Fagin et al., 1995]. Their mother tells them
that if they get dirty, there will be severe consequences. Now, it so happens
that during their play, some of the children, say k of them, get mud on their
foreheads. Each can see mud on the others, but not on his own forehead, so
no one says anything. Along comes their father who says, “At least one of you
has mud on your forehead,” thus expressing a fact known to each of them
before he speaks (if k > 1). The father then asks the following question
repeatedly : “Do any of you know whether or not you have mud on your
own forehead?” Assuming that the children are all perceptive, intelligent,
truthful, and that they answer simultaneously, what will happen? There is
a ‘proof’ that the first k − 1 times he asks the question, they will all answer
“No,” but the kth time, the children with muddy foreheads will all answer
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“Yes.”
For this puzzle, a straightforward epistemic logic formalization can lead
to inconsistent sets of hypotheses [Bryukhov, 2006; Fitting, 2006; Fitting,
2007a]. For example, the sets
J(c1 ∨ c2 ∨ . . . ∨ cn),
J(kw i Cj) for all i 6= j,
J¬(kw i Ci) for all i,
are inconsistent for all n ≥ 2.
For the sake of observing the complexity of the realization process, one
can find the complexities of this contradictory formalization for five children
in the following graphs.
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[McCarthy et al., 1978] uses a version of logic similar to S4Jn with all
modalities graded by time to present a model-based solution of Muddy Chil-
dren. This solution has a model hence it avoids introduction of a contradic-
tion. For reference we present it in Appendix A.
Here we present three of the possible formalizations of the Muddy Chil-
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dren puzzle for three children, using McCarthy’s idea. Graphs for each com-
plexity measure are given after the last formalization, we merged them for
the ease of comparison.
We use the following notation:
• K-modality has two indices now: time and agent, i.e. Kt,aA stands for
‘At time t, agent a knows A.’
• EtA ::= Kt,a1A ∧ . . . ∧Kt,an stands for ‘Everybody knows A at time
t.’
• kwt,a A ::= Kt,aA ∨ Kt,a¬A, i.e. ‘At the moment t agent a knows
whether or not A holds.’
We use the McCarthy’s idea only, not his system. We stay in S4Jn, no new
axioms or rules related to time are introduced, and Kt,a is just a syntactic
sugar for K(t−1)n+a, where n is the number of agents.
Without loss of generality, let us assume that the first and third children
are dirty, and the second one is clean, i.e., c1,¬c2, c3.
(A) Longer version
Hypotheses:




4. kw3,2 (kw2,1 c1);
5. K3,2(
6. (kw2,1 c3) ∧ (kw2,1 c2)∧
7. K2,1(
8. ¬(kw1,1 c1)∧ ¬(kw1,2 c2)∧ ¬(kw1,3 c3)∧
9. (E1(c1 ∨ c2 ∨ c3))∧
10. (kw1,1 c2) ∧ (kw1,1 c3)∧
11. (kw1,2 c1) ∧ (kw1,2 c3)∧
12. (kw1,3 c1) ∧ (kw1,3 c2)
))
13. K3,2((c1 ∧ c2 ∧ c3)→ ¬ kw2,1 c1)
Conclusion: kw3,2 c2
Lines 2–3 At moment 3, the second child knows whether or not the
first and the third children are muddy.
Line 4 At moment 3, the second child knows whether or not the first
child at moment 2 knew wheather or not he was muddy.
Line 5 At moment 3, the second child knows ...
[Line 6] ... at moment 2, the first child knew whether the second
and the third children are muddy or not, and
[Line 7] ... at moment 2, the first child knows ...
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[Line 8] ... at the first moment, nobody knew whether or not
they were muddy, and
[Line 9] ... at the first moment, everybody knew that at least
one of them was muddy, and
[Line 10] ... at the first moment, the first child knew whether or
not the second and third children were muddy, and
[Line 11] ... at the first moment, the second child knew whether
or not the first and the third children were muddy, and
[Line 12] ... at the first moment, the third child knew whether
or not the first and the second children were muddy.
Line 13 At moment 3, the second child knows that if all of them are
dirty, the first child at moment 2 did not know whether or not he
was muddy.
Conclusion At moment 3, the second child knew whether or not he
was muddy.
The last hypothesis cannot be relaxed because in situations where a
child says that (s)he does not know if (s)he is muddy, (s)he cannot
really derive it in S4Jn. So when the system perform case analysis, we
have to help it with such implications.
(B) A short version:
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If we make second,third and fourth premises stronger, We then obtain
a shorter version:
Hypotheses:




5. K3,2 ((c1 ∧ c2 ∧ c3)→ ¬kw2,1 c1)
Conclusion: kw3,2 c2 .
(C) A short version with J:
We would like to see some modalities realized as proof terms, so we
replaced all modalities that represent facts that everyone knows (due
to public announcements or general conditions of the puzzle) with J.
We also strengthen the conclusion to state that at the third moment,
everyone knows that everyone knows about themselves, so we have to
add lines (6), (7) to bring the knowledge of the first and third children
from step 2 to step 3, and we add (9) to reflect the fact that if the
second child learns about himself, he will announce it. We did not
perform this transformation with the longer version because the prover
was overwhelmed by the complexity.
Hypotheses:
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6. J(K2,1c1 → K3,1c1)
7. J(K2,3c3 → K3,3c3)
8. J((c1 ∧ c2 ∧ c3)→ ¬(kw2,1 c1))
9. J(K3,2c2 → J(K3,2 c2))
Conclusion: J(K3,2¬c2 ∧K3,1c1 ∧K3,3c3).





Following [Brezhnev and Kuznets, 2006] and [Artemov, 2004], a polynomial
realization algorithm for S4nLP was implemented in MetaPRL Logical Frame-
work and connected with S4Jn prover [Bryukhov, 2006]. This procedure was
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run on several interesting examples presented in this text. Performance-
wise, the bottleneck was always on S4Jn prover’s side. On the other hand,
even small S4Jn Gentzen-style proofs result in long S4nLP Hilbert-style proofs
which are beyond human comprehension. Though we made certain efforts to
mitigate this issue, the most usable results of each run of the algorithm are
the lengths of the proof and outer term, and realized formula itself.
We used Ocsigen Web-server (http://ocsigen.org) to make this work
available as a simple Web application at http://yegor.org/s4nlp/theorem .
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Appendix A
This is the description of the KT5 logical system given by John McCarthy
in his On the Model Theory of Knowledge paper [McCarthy et al., 1978],
where KT5 is K5 with time.
K-modality now has two indices: time and agent, i.e. Kt1,a1A stands for
‘At time t1 agent a1 knows A.’ And J-modality has one index: time, i.e. Jt
means that at time t everybody knows . . ..
Axioms:
M1. ¬¬A→ A
M2. A→ (B → A)
M3. (A→ (B → C))→ ((A→ B)→ (A→ C))
M4. Kt,aA→ A
M5. JtA→ JtKt,aA
M6. (Kt1,aA→ B)→ (Kt2,aA→ Kt2,aB), where t1 ≤ t2
M7. ¬Kt,a → Kt,a¬Kt,aA
Inference rules:
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R1. (A→ B), A ` B (modus ponens)
R4. A ` Kt,aA (Kt,a necessitation)
Definition. K is a knowledge set for Kt,a if K satisfies the following
conditions:
(KS1) K is consistent.
(KS2) K = Kt,aK, where K = {A|K ` A}, i.e., closed with respect to all
modalities.
(KS3) if K ` Kt,aA1 ∨ . . . ∨Kt,aAn, then K ` Ai for some i (1 ≤ i ≤ n).
Definition. B is a knowledge base for Kt,a if B satisfies the following
conditions:
(KB1) B is consistent;
(KB2) B ⊂ Kt,aB, where B = {A|B ` A};
(KB3) if B ` Kt,aA1 ∨ . . . ∨Kt,aAn, then B ` Ai for some i (1 ≤ i ≤ n).
By (KS2) and (KB2), we see that any element in K (or B) has the form
Kt,aA. It is easy to see that if B is a knowledge base for Kt,a, then Kt,aB is
a knowledge set for Kt,a
Lemma 3 The following conditions are equivalent:
1. If Γ 0 A then Γ ` ¬Kt,aA;
2. If Γ ` Kt,aA1 ∨ . . . ∨Kt,aAn then Γ ` Ai for some i (1 ≤ i ≤ n);
3. If Γ ` Kt,aA, then Γ ` A or Γ ` ¬A.
The puzzle of unfaithful wives is usually stated as follows:
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There was a country which was inhabited by one million married couples.
Of these one million wives, 40 were unfaithful. The situation was that each
husband knew whether the other men’s wives were unfaithful but not if his
own wife was unfaithful. One day (call it the first day), the king of the
country issued the following decree:
(A) There is at least one unfaithful wife.
(B) Each husband knows whether or not other men’s wives are unfaithful.
(C) Every night (from tonight), each man must perform his deduction,
based on his current knowledge, and try to prove whether his wife is
unfaithful or not.
(D) Each man who has succeeded in proving that his wife is unfaithful must
chop off her head the next morning.
(E) Every morning, each man must determine whether or not somebody
chopped off his wife’s head.
(F) Each man’s knowledge prior to this decree’s issuance consists of only
the knowledge about other men’s wives’ unfaithfulness.
The problem is, ‘what will happen under this situation?’ The answer is
that on the 41st day, 40 unfaithful wives will have been beheaded.
Let’s assume that there are k (k ≥ 1) married couples in the country. Let
ai denote the i







i , where εi ∈ {0, 1} and p1i (p0i ) denotes pi(¬pi).




i }, i.e., Π0 excludes the case
in which all wives are faithful.
Now, let Γ denote what the King publicized on the first day, and Bπ(Kn,ai)
(i = 1, . . . , k) denote a knowledge base for Kn,ai under the situation π =
πε1,...,εk ∈ Π0.
Let
dBπ(Kn,ai) ` Ae =

> if Bπ(Kn,ai) ` A
⊥ otherwise
dBπ(Kn,ai) 0 Ae =

> if Bπ(Kn,ai) 0 A
⊥ otherwise .
Let’s put (k) = {1, . . . , k}. Then, as formalization of the puzzle, the




j | j 6= i, j ∈ (1, . . . , k)}, where π = πε1,...,εk Eq(π, i, 1)
states that knowledge base for agent ai on the n
th day under the situation
π is following: on the first day every husaband knows what the King publi-




{[Kn+1,ai ][Kn,aj ] pj | Bπ(Kn,aj) ` aj, j ∈ (k)}⋃
{[Kn+1,ai ]¬[Kn,aj ] pj | Bπ(Kn,aj) 0 aj, j ∈ (k)} Eq(π, i, n+ 1)
states that the knowledge base for agent ai on the n+ 1
th day under the
situation π is following: on the (n+1)st day each husband has the knowledge
he acquired on the previous day, and each hasband sees whether somebody






{J1K1,ai pj | j 6= i, i ∈ (k), j ∈ (k)}⋃
{J1(π → (dBπ(Kn,ai) ` pie → Jn+1Kn,ai pi)) | π ∈ Π0, i ∈ (k), n ∈ N+}⋃
{J1(π → (dBπ(Kn,ai) 0 pie → Jn+1¬Kn,ai pi)) | π ∈ Π0, i ∈ (k), n ∈ N+}⋃
{J1(dBπ(Kn,ai) ` Ae → Jn+1(π → Kn,ai A)) | π ∈ Π0, i ∈ (k)} Eq(∗)
States that on the first day the King announced the following:
On the first day it is common knowledge that at least one wife is unfaith-
ful, and
it is common knowledge that on the first day, each husband knows whether
other men’s wives are unfaithful or not, and
it is common knowledge that under situation π, if on the nth day a hus-
band derives that his wife was unfaithful, then on the next day it becomes
common knowledge that he knows it, and
it is common knowledge that under situation π, if on the nth day a hus-
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band does not derive that his wife was unfaithful, then on the next day it
becomes common knowledge that he does not know it, and
it is common knowledge that if a husband derives anything, say A, then
on the next day it becomes common knowledge that given the situation π,
he can derive it.
Since meta-notions such as knowledge base and provability (`) cannot be
expressed directly in our language, we were forced to interpret the King’s
decree into Γ in a somewhat indirect fashion.
Now, if we read Eq(∗) as the definition of Γ, we find that the definition
is circular since in order that Γ may be definable by Eq(∗), it is necessary
that Bπ(Kn,ai) are already defined, whereas Bπ(Kn,ai) are defined in terms
of Γ in Eqs(π, i, n). So, we will treat these equations as a system
Σ = {Eq(π, i, n) | π ∈ Π0, i ∈ (k), n ∈ N+}
⋃
{Eq(∗)}
of equations with the unknowns {Bπ(Kn,ai) | π ∈ Π0, i ∈ (k), n ∈ N+}
and Γ. We will solve Σ under the following conditions:
• For any π ∈ Π0, Γ ∪ {π} is consistent.
• For any π ∈ Π0 and for ith agent on nth day, Bπ(Kn,ai) is his knowledge
base.




Here is the list of 20 axioms:
C1 : A→ (B → A)
C2 : (A→ (B → C))→ ((A→ B)→ (A→ C))
C3 : A ∧B → A
C4 : A ∧B → B
C5 : A→ (B → (A ∧B))
C6 : A→ (A ∨B)
C7 : B → (A ∨B)
C8 : (A→ C)→ ((B → C)→ (A ∨B → C))
C9 : (A→ C)→ ((A→ ¬B)→ ¬A)
C10 : ¬¬A→ A
C11 : A ∨ ¬A
C12 : s : (A→ B)→ (t : A→ (s · t) : B)
C13 : t : A→ A
C14 : t : A→!t : t : A
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C15 : t : A→ (s+ t) : A
C16 : s : A→ (s+ t) : A
C17 : Ki(A→ B)→ (KiA→ KiB)
C18 : KiA→ A
C19 : KiA→ KiKiA
C20 : t : A→ KiA
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